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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation investigates the strategic resource-allocation decision making of 
traditional public schools and public charter schools seeking to close the achievement gap 
among low- and high-performing students in response to the No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001 (NCLB), as well as factors hypothesized to explain this decision making. 
NCLB is the reauthorization of the nation’s omnibus Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). NCLB is a sweeping amalgam of legislative elements 
and prior reform ingredients recast into a blueprint for standards-based reform. The 
central purpose of NCLB is that all traditional public school students, and defined student 
subgroups thereof, reach academic “proficiency” by the 2013-2014 academic year. 
NCLB monitors progress toward meeting academic “proficiency” through Adequate 
Yearly Progress (AYP) calculations, a series of minimum competency performance 
targets that must be met by schools and school districts to avoid sanctions of increasing 
severity. In theory, NCLB’s threat of sanctions increases incentives for schools and 
school districts to elevate learning opportunities for traditionally low-performing students 
and student subgroups. 
However, some assert that NCLB’s finely tuned attention to improving academic 
opportunities for traditionally low-performing students and student subgroups 
compromises educational needs and opportunities of high-performing, academically 
accelerated students (Colangelo, Assouline, & Gross, 2004a, 2004b; Davidson & 
 2
Davidson, 2005; Gallagher, 2004; Renzulli, 2005; Ruf, 2005; Sausner, 2005). In a two-
part report sponsored by the John Templeton Foundation, Colangelo et al. (2004a) argued 
that NCLB ignores high-performing students to the detriment of their expected learning 
trajectories: 
Schools pay lip-service to the proposition that students should learn at their own 
pace; in reality, for countless highly able children the pace of their progress 
through school is determined by the rate of progress of their classmates. . . . [T]he 
No Child Left Behind legislation, which aims to bring all children up to 
proficiency, is the national focus on education. This is an admirable goal and 
worthy of our efforts. However, NCLB ignored those students who are well above 
proficiency, and these students are also worthy of our best effort. (pp. 1-2) 
 
Despite speculation that high-achieving students have been “deceived” and 
“denied” as a result of NCLB (Sausner, 2005, p. 1), there is limited empirical evidence 
that NCLB’s minimum-competency standards actually inhibit the progress of high-
performing students. Furthermore, there is scant scientific understanding of factors that 
may explain strategic resource-allocation decision making in response to minimum-
competency accountability systems. Consequently, ideological predispositions have 
dominated burgeoning public and scholarly interest in distributional effects under 
NCLB’s accountability system.1 
As Congress approaches reauthorization of NCLB in 2007, it is vital to quantify 
the frequency and magnitude of achievement tradeoffs occurring under NCLB and the 
processes by which resource-allocation decisions are undertaken. Identification will help 
policy makers determine whether gains of marginal-performing students are indeed 
                                                 
1For instance, advocates contend that accountability policies will make teachers and schools more 
effective, thus ensuring high-quality instructional curricula for all students. Opponents, on the 
other hand, argue that accountability policies will lead to a “leveling” effect from a “one-size-fits-
all” curriculum. For a more thorough analysis of potential effects of high-stakes testing delineated 
by students, teachers, administrators, and policymakers, see Stecher (2002) and Koretz, 
McCaffrey, and Hamilton (2001). 
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occurring at the expense of high-performing students and, consequently, whether present 
accountability policies should be modified.2 
 
Research Questions 
This dissertation analyzes both longitudinal, student-level test score and school-
level accountability data from Idaho. Student-level test score data were furnished by the 
Northwest Evaluation Association (NWEA). School-level accountability data were 
collected from the Idaho State Department of Education. These data were then used to 
answer the following research questions: 
1.  Have Idaho schools responded to NCLB by raising the achievement of failing 
students relative to the achievement of nonfailing students? 
2.  Have Idaho schools responded to NCLB by raising the achievement of failing 
subgroups relative to the achievement of nonfailing subgroups? 
3.  Have Idaho schools responded to NCLB by raising the achievement of failing 
students at the expense of high-performing students? 
4.  Do other programmatic features of NCLB, such as severity of sanctions, 
overlapping student subgroups, and high-stakes testing in terminal grades, better explain 
strategic resource-allocation decision making? 
5.  Does increased market sensitivity in public charter schools impact resource-
allocation practices? 
                                                 
2The United States Department of Education is exploring use of growth model calculations to 
determine Adequate Yearly Progress. Earlier this year 20 states submitted proposals to participate 
in a pilot growth model program. Although eight of these proposals made it to a second round of 
review (i.e., Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, North Carolina, Oregon, and 
Tennessee), North Carolina and Tennessee were the only states selected to participate. 
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Defining Strategic Resource-Allocation Decisions 
Investigating strategic resource-allocation decision making by schools seeking to 
close the achievement gap requires a measure that captures systematic shifts in 
intraschool resource distribution. Recognizing that no formal accounting system tracks 
allocation of resources at the student or classroom level,3 distributional inequities in 
student achievement among low- and high-performing student achievement are used to 
infer a reprioritization of intraschool resources. 
An NCLB-induced resource-allocation decision is detected if a greater than 
expected increase in the achievement of traditionally low-performing students occurs in 
tandem with a less than expected increase in the achievement of traditionally high-
performing students. The term low-/high-achievement tradeoff is used throughout this 
dissertation to imply a strategic resource-allocation decision made by a school in 
response to Idaho’s high-stakes accountability program. 
Reliance on distributional inequities to infer strategic resource-allocation decision 
making in response to high-stakes accountability assumes implicitly that there is a 
resource constraint on schools. A resource constraint implies, in effect, that elevating the 
performance of traditionally low-performing students necessitates that schools give up 
something, somewhere else. If Idaho public schools indeed operate consistently within 
this zero sum view, then examining the distribution of student achievement to infer 
strategic resource-allocation decision making is fitting. 
                                                 
3For a more complete discussion of data deficiencies in contemporary educational research, 
practice, and policy see Guthrie (2006). Guthrie argues that the next generation of education 
reform necessitates design and implementation of a comprehensive national data system linking 
inputs, throughputs, and outcomes at the student, school, and classroom levels.  
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However, if schools operate in the absence of resource constraints, then it is 
difficult to infer tradeoffs. Theoretically, schools unconstrained by resources are capable 
of elevating the outcomes of low-performing students without diverting attention and 
resources away from other students. Conversely, schools simply may become more 
efficient, in that they respond to systemic incentives by doing more with the same level 
and distribution of resources as in years prior. In light of these potential confounding 
scenarios, alternative explanations will remain to be explored if this dissertation finds no 
evidence of achievement tradeoffs. 
 
Outline 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter II provides a summary 
review of relevant literature. Although considerable interest and controversy surround 
achievement tradeoffs in high-stakes accountability programs, surprisingly little 
empirical research has addressed the issue of achievement tradeoffs using student-level 
achievement data. To date, most scholarly research has examined the association between 
(a) accountability programs and mean achievement growth; (b) accountability programs 
and school, classroom, or teacher behavior and practices indirectly linked to student-level 
achievement data; or (c) accountability programs and system gaming (e.g., teachers 
altering test scores and/or assisting students with test questions). Chapter II concludes by 
discussing why further research is warranted. 
Chapter III describes Idaho’s Assessment and Accountability Program (ISAAP). 
ISAAP’s genesis was a set of content and achievement standards established in 1994, and 
subsequently revisited in 2000 and 2001, by the Idaho legislature, State Board of 
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Education, and Citizen’s Commission on Assessment and Accountability. ISAAP 
complied with federal guidelines and regulations associated with NCLB as of 2003. 
Chapter III also characterizes resource-allocation decision making by schools in response 
to ISAAP by borrowing insight from economic and psychological theory and by building 
upon education domain-specific theory and empiricism found in pre-NCLB research. 
Chapter IV describes data sources, data development, and lastly the basic 
estimation strategies employed in measuring the presence and magnitude of achievement 
tradeoffs and in examining several mediating factors that may help explain strategic 
resource-allocation decision making. Indicators of interest include whether (a) a school 
has failed to meet state-prescribed proficiency, (b) a student is part of a student subgroup 
that failed to meet state-prescribed proficiency, and (c) a student has failed to meet state-
prescribed proficiency in the subject for which a school also failed. Identified mediating 
factors that may explain further why one student category is rewarded at the expense of 
another include whether (a) a student is part of more than one student subgroup held 
accountable to the state’s minimum competency proficiency targets (e.g., economically 
disadvantaged and black), (b) a student is in a terminal grade, and (c) differences in 
market sensitivity across traditional public schools and public charter schools. 
Chapter V reports results from a series of general linear models used to estimate 
whether and, if so, how schools are responding to Idaho’s minimum competency 
accountability program. The dependent variable across all reported models is a fall-to-
spring student gain score in mathematics as measured by the Idaho State Assessment Test 
(ISAT). Results consistently indicate positive and statistically significant gains for 
traditionally low-performing students. These results persist after (a) adjusting regressors 
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for meaningful variation between grades in average student performance gains and (b) 
standardizing the dependent variable in an effort to gauge the potential influence of mean 
reverting measurement error on estimates. There is strong evidence that NCLB’s threat of 
sanctions increases incentives for schools and school districts to elevate learning 
opportunities for traditionally low-performing students and student subgroups. Moreover, 
the increased performance by traditionally low-performing students and student 
subgroups do not occur at the expense of traditionally high-performing students. Indeed, 
results indicate that NCLB’s threat of sanction has increased the efficiency in which 
traditional public schools operate in Idaho.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
Although considerable interest and controversy surround the issue of achievement 
tradeoffs in high-stakes accountability programs, surprisingly little empirical research has 
addressed the issue using student-level achievement data. This deficiency is due in large 
part to data limitations and to the fact that minimum competency accountability programs 
were not as potent a feature of state public education systems until federal enactment of 
NCLB in 2002.4 
To date most scholarly research has examined the association between (a) 
accountability programs and mean achievement growth; (b) accountability programs and 
school, classroom, or teacher behavior and practices indirectly linked to student-level 
achievement data; or (c) accountability programs and system gaming (e.g., teachers 
altering test scores and/or assisting students with test questions). As such, and as the 
following summary review of literature concludes, advent of NCLB’s accountability 
structure and the unique policy conditions present in states not yet rigorously examined 
                                                 
4Generally speaking, accountability programs have existed in many forms for a long time (Kirst, 
1990; Resnick, 1982; Stecher, Hamilton, & Naftel, 2005). However, it was not until codification 
of NCLB’s reform agenda and its rigid incentive system and ambitious performance targets that 
the public education landscape was truly characterized by high-stakes accountability. Even 
though accountability programs were implemented in approximately 80% of states prior to 
NCLB, only 14 states used student performance measures to assign discrete grades or ratings to 
all schools and/or school districts prior to NCLB (Reback, 2006). Furthermore, only 17 states 
ever fully complied with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1994 directives 
(Wanker & Christie, 2005). Yet, by the close of NCLB’s first year of implementation, all 50 
states were in compliance with NCLB policies. 
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warrant further research on the relationship between achievement tradeoffs and high-
stakes accountability programs. 
 
Accountability Programs and Mean Achievement 
Prior studies have modeled whether statewide accountability systems altered 
predicted math and reading achievement, as measured by the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP) or by a combination of outcome measures, including 
NAEP, ACT and SAT (two college placement tests), and Advanced Placement (AP) 
scores. 
Carnoy and Loeb (2002) constructed an index of the intensity of the 
accountability mechanism in all 50 states in order to analyze whether the strength of 
accountability mechanisms was systematically related to mean mathematics gains, as 
measured by NAEP. Using data from 1996 to 2000, and after adjusting analyses for 
changing inclusion rates of special education and limited English proficiency students, 
they found a positive and significant relationship between NAEP math scores and 
strength of accountability mechanisms across all race/ethnicity categories at the eighth- 
grade level and for African-American fourth graders. In substantive terms, Carnoy and 
Loeb concluded that a two-step increase on their 0-to-5 accountability scale was 
associated with an approximate one half a standard deviation higher gain in the 
percentage of students that achieved a proficiency rating of at least basic. 
Hanushek and Raymond (2005) modeled whether introduction of a statewide 
accountability system altered predicted math and reading gains using a sample of 
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approximately 40 states.5 A state’s accountability system was considered “introduced” if 
the state published outcome information aggregated at the school level and provided a 
means by which this information could be interpreted. Drawing upon two cohort 
observations from NAEP to estimate math and reading growth, Hanushek and Raymond 
concluded that pre-NCLB accountability systems led to improved student performance in 
the aggregate. However, their work concluded that pre-NCLB accountability instruments 
were not effective in closing achievement disparities by race.  
In response to significant growth on statewide assessments and NAEP 
mathematics assessment from 1990 to 1997, Grissmer and Flanigan (1998) conducted an 
in-depth case study of North Carolina and Texas education systems to better understand 
test score gains. Their study reported that significant gains in student achievement could 
not be attributed to increased school spending, reduced student-teacher ratios, or 
increased levels of teacher training. Instead, Grissmer and Flanigan attributed 
achievement gains to state-level accountability programs closely linked to academic 
standards. 
Conversely, in a set of controversial studies,6 Amrein and Berliner (2002a, 2002b) 
found no effect, or in some cases a negative effect, of accountability structures on student 
achievement gains. In their first study, Amrein and Berliner (2002a) identified 18 states 
whose public school accountability policies were characterized by the “most severe 
consequences.” They then modeled the impact of these programs on several outcome 
measures, including NAEP, ACT and SAT, and AP scores. Amrein and Berliner 
                                                 
5Reported sample size ranged from 38 to 42 states and 68 to 138 observations. 
  
6For more information on the controversy surrounding the Amrein and Berliner papers see 
Amrein-Beardsley and Berliner (2003), J. P. Greene and Forster (2003), Raymond and Hanushek 
(2003), Thompson (2003), and Winter (2002). 
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concluded that these states’ accountability mechanisms exerted no positive effect on 
student outcomes. Moreover, in a follow-up study that included an additional 17 states, 
Amrein and Berliner again reported no positive effect of public school accountability 
policies on student outcomes. 
 
Accountability Programs and School,  
Classroom, or Teacher Behavior and Practices 
A second strand of prior research on educational accountability involved use of 
survey and observational data to study the impact of accountability structures on school, 
principal, and teacher behavior and practices. In a case study of four Chicago elementary 
schools, two of which were high-performing and two low-performing, Diamond and 
Spillane (2004, p. 1148) examined differential responses by teachers and administrators 
in terms of (a) responses to incentive structures, (b) interpretation and use of test score 
data, and (c) setting of instructional priorities. They concluded that low-performing 
schools on probation focused on raising the performance of students within student 
subgroups considered failing, whereas high-performing elementary schools appeared to 
allocate time and energy equally across all students and grades. 
In 2002, Ladd and Zelli reported results from surveys administered in 1997 and 
1999 to a random stratified sample of approximately 70 North Carolina elementary 
school principals. These surveys examined principals’ behavioral responses to their 
respective state’s accountability program. Ladd and Zelli reported that principals 
responded by redirecting resources to math and reading, integrating math and reading 
into other courses and into extracurricular activities, increasing time spent with teachers 
to improve instruction, and shifting attention from high- to low-performing students in an 
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effort to avoid probationary status (p. 54). Furthermore, principals reported that their 
respective program’s incentive structure made it even more difficult to fill teacher and 
administrative vacancies in traditionally “hard-to-staff” schools. 
Koretz, Barron, Mitchell, and Stecher (1996) conducted a large-scale evaluation 
of the Kentucky Instructional Results Information System (KIRIS), finding that teachers 
operating under the state’s mandated accountability program elevated their expectations 
of high-performing students, but not necessarily of low-performing or special need 
students. Their results were based on surveys administered to random representative 
samples of fourth-grade teachers, eighth-grade mathematics teachers, and fourth- and 
eighth-grade principals across Kentucky, as well as interviews with 115 principals and 
216 teachers in the state. A subsequent study by Koretz and Barron (1998, p. 1) reported 
that student gains in response to Kentucky’s accountability program could be attributed to 
“item-specific coaching tailored to reused items” on high-stakes assessments, and that 
these gains were sufficiently sizable in ensuing years to discount somewhat the argument 
that test familiarization, and not the accountability program’s incentive structure, had 
spurred the vast and sustained growth in student achievement witnessed over the period 
under examination. 
 
Accountability Programs and System-Gaming 
Presently, a rapidly growing strand of research is investigating whether schools 
respond to accountability programs by “gaming” the system. Studies have documented 
schools gaming accountability systems in a spectrum of manners, including (a) focusing 
excessively on a single test and altering test scores and/or assisting students with test 
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questions (Goodnough, 1999; Koretz et al., 1996; Jacob & Levitt, 2003), (b) strategically 
reclassifying students as special education and limited English proficiency (Cullen & 
Reback, 2002; Deere & Strayer, 2001; Figlio & Getzler, 2002; Jacob, 2005), (c) using 
discipline procedures to ensure that low-performing students will be absent on test day 
(Figlio, 2005), (d) manipulating grade retention policies (Haney, 2000; Jacob, 2005), (e) 
misreporting administrative data (Peabody & Markley, 2003), (f) acquiescing in parents’ 
demands for test exemptions and waivers (Neufeld, 2000), and (g) planning nutrition-
enriched lunch menus prior to test day (Figlio & Winicki, 2005). 
Jacob and Levitt (2003), for example, developed a statistical algorithm to detect 
unexpected fluctuations in students’ test scores and unusual patterns of answers for 
students within a classroom. The validity of their instrument was confirmed through a 
series of “retesting” experiments. When applied to Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) 
results from the Chicago Public School System from 1993 through 2000, Jacob and 
Levitt found that the likelihood of cheating in a classroom whose prior performance was 
one standard deviation below the mean increased by roughly 29% in response to 
accountability policies. 
Using detailed student-level panel data and controlling for student-level fixed 
effects, Figlio and Getlzer (2002) examined whether initiation of the Florida 
Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT) influenced public schools’ decision making on 
special education assignments. They found that low-performing students and students 
from low socioeconomic backgrounds were significantly and substantively more likely to 
be reclassified into exempted disability categories and that this practice was significantly 
more likely to occur in high-poverty schools than in their more affluent counterparts.  
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This evidence suggested that Florida public schools might have responded to the state’s 
accountability program by reclassifying certain students in order to reduce the 
contribution of these students to the aggregate measures of test performance upon which 
schools were judged. 
 
Accountability Programs and Achievement Tradeoffs 
With the exception of one study from NCLB’s first year of operation, previous 
research on the effect of accountability programs on student outcomes have focused 
exclusively on pre-NCLB accountability programs. 
In reaction to extraordinary student progress reported by the state of Texas over 
the period between 1993 and 1999, Deere and Strayer (2001), for instance, analyzed 
achievement data for 3rd- through 8th- and 10th-grade students nested in approximately 
4,290 traditional public school campuses.7 They found that students’ passing rates on 
high-stakes accountability tests in math, reading, and writing increased substantially 
relative to those on low-stakes tests in social studies and science. Furthermore, when 
conditioned on initial score, the average test score increment in math or reading (t+2 – 
t+1) decreased from low- to high-performing student subgroups. That is, students 
clustered in the lowest sextile had the greatest average score increment (M = 4.12; r = 
                                                 
7Mean campus Texas Accountability and Assessment System (TAAS) score pass rates 
“skyrocketed” from 1993 to 1998 in math, reading, and writing. Deere and Strayer (2001) noted 
that, “Along with a 13% increase in the average math score and a 7% increase in the average 
reading score, passing rates rose sharply over the period. Between 1994 and 1999, the fraction of 
all students who passed the math test increased from 58% to 85%, and the fraction who passed 
the reading test increased from 74% to 86%. Over this period the fraction of schools that received 
the ‘exemplary’ designation (the highest accountability rating) rose from 1.3% to 11.7% as 
passing rates increased. Likewise, the ‘recognized’ rating (second highest rating) was given to 
36.8% of school in 1999, up from 13.1% in 1994” (p. 2). Deere and Strayer’s dataset included 
approximately 1.7 million observations per year, or an approximate total of 8.5 million student-
year observations for the period encompassing the 1993 through 1999 school years. 
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4.67), and students in the highest sextile had the smallest average score increment (M = 
1.48; r = 1.27). Even after taking into consideration regression to the mean, Deere and 
Strayer found that students at or below the passing level exhibited the greatest 
improvement on tests. 
Holmes (2003) analyzed achievement data for third- through eighth-graders in 
North Carolina to examine the distributional effects of accountability programs within 
traditional public schools. Holmes advanced Deere and Strayer’s (2001) work by 
constructing an indicator variable that measured teachers’ short-run incentive to target 
instruction to particular students. Holmes (2003) concluded that North Carolina’s 
incentive program led to distributional inequities, in that students with greater potential to 
influence a school’s accountability rating from a given increase in test scores were 
targeted with more resources than those students whose expected test score growth was 
less relevant under the system’s incentive structure. On average, achievement gains for 
“targeted students” were 1.47 to 3.79 points greater in reading and 1.25 to 2.62 points 
greater in math during the 1999-2000 school year. 
Relying on student-level panel data generated from the Texas Assessment of 
Academic Skills (TAAS), Reback (2006) explored more subtle intricacies of potential 
achievement tradeoffs occurring under Texas’ Accountability Plan. Reback calculated the 
effect exerted by an improvement in the scores of certain students or student subgroups 
on the probability a school would improve its accountability rating. Using marginal 
effects as indicator variables in equations predicting actual test score gains, Reback found 
that a one standard deviation increase in his incentive measure was associated with 
approximately a .007 standard deviation increase in a student’s place in the statewide 
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achievement distribution. His study concluded that marginally performing students 
ultimately exhibited the most improvement, while low- and high-performing students 
gained less than peers in schools where incentives to elevate the performance of 
marginally performing students were weaker. 
Booher-Jennings’ (2005) case study of an urban elementary school located in a 
low-socioeconomic neighborhood in Texas explored “how” and “why” teachers 
responded to the state’s accountability program during NCLB’s inaugural year. Booher-
Jennings found teachers in the school practiced a form of “educational triage” in which 
resources were focused on students close to the passing score to the detriment of peers 
farther from the proficiency threshold. Students close to the threshold were pulled out for 
small group tutoring sessions with the lead teacher for approximately 90 minutes each 
day, while the rest of the class was given seat work under the supervision of local college 
students hired by the school. Booher-Jennings described the observed targeting of 
individualized instruction as a dynamic process in which pass-rate thresholds were re-
defined by teachers and administrators according to achievement test results reported by 
the state to the school. 
Finally, Chakrabarti (2006) examined whether public schools facing voucher 
threats under Florida’s Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP) behaved strategically. 
OSP provided families taxpayer-funded tuition payments for their children to attend 
another academic institution, public or private, if their present public school was 
identified as “failing.”8 Chakrabarti reported that failing public schools responded by 
focusing additional attention on low-performing students, but that increased performance 
                                                 
8In January 2006, the Florida Supreme Court in a 5-2 opinion declared the Opportunity 
Scholarship Program unconstitutional because voucher recipients could use taxpayer dollars for 
private education. 
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by low-performing students did not come at the expense of high-performing peers, as 
evidenced by a decline in high-performing peer achievement of consistently less than 1% 
per annum over the period under study. Chakrabarti also detected strategic behavior 
whereby failing schools seeking to avoid sanction focused additional attention on the 
FCAT writing test as the easiest of the high-stakes assessments for students to pass. 
 
Why More Research is Needed 
Additional research on the impact of high-stakes accountability programs on 
achievement tradeoffs is warranted for several reasons. First, evidence on accountability 
programs resulting in tradeoffs that negatively affect high-achieving students is decidedly 
mixed. Studies of pre-NCLB accountability programs in Texas and North Carolina 
suggested the presence of achievement tradeoffs working to the detriment of traditionally 
high-performing students, while evidence from Florida indicated that elevated 
achievement of low-performing students did not come at the expense of high-performing 
peers’ estimated gains. 
Second, prior research suggests that idiosyncratic features of state accountability 
policies might differentially impact teacher and school behavior (Swanson & Stevenson, 
2002). Consequently, it is likely that findings from one state may not replicate necessarily 
in another.9 For instance, NCLB permits considerable latitude across states in the level of 
                                                 
9Even though Booher-Jennings conducted her research during the 2002-03 school year, the Texas 
Accountability Program differed substantively from NCLB accountability regulations and 
mandates. Booher-Jennings (2005, pp. 260-261) noted that Texas’ treatment of special education 
students, the minimum number of students needed when reporting subgroup results, and inclusion 
of mobile students in AYP calculations did not conform to NCLB mandates. 
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academic achievement that constitutes “proficiency.”10 In a Thomas B. Fordham 
Foundation report that evaluated accountability programs in 30 states, Cross, Rebarber, 
and Torres (2004) reported significant variation in the standards states require for a 
student to be labeled “proficient.” Kingsbury (2003), too, found significant variance in 
their evaluation of proficiency standards in 14 states, noting in particular that differences 
among state standards reflected “dramatically different visions of what it means [for a 
student] to be proficient” (p. 13). Recognizing that NCLB provides states considerable 
autonomy in the design of their respective accountability programs, one might also 
expect intrastate variation in achievement tradeoffs due to variation in state prescribed 
proficiency targets11 and minimum student subgroup sizes (or n sizes),12 as well as to 
relative penetration of marketplace competition from charter and private schools. 
Third, distributional effects in the context of NCLB’s long-term agenda may be 
different from those elicited in Florida, North Carolina, and Texas. NCLB requires that 
all public school students, and defined student subgroups thereof, reach academic 
“proficiency” by the 2013-2014 school year. This target is significantly more ambitious 
                                                 
10For instance, NCLB guidelines simply state that, “Each State shall demonstrate that the State 
has adopted challenging academic content standards and challenging student academic 
achievement standards that will be used by the State” (P.L. 107-110, Section 1111(b)(1)(A)). 
NCLB also permits flexibility in the minimum size of subgroups, selection of factors used to 
calculate AYP, determination of targets for incremental improvement, and definition of full 
academic year. 
 
11D. R. Greene, Trimble, and Lewis (2003) offered an interesting analysis of the effect of multiple 
standard-setting procedures employed by the Kentucky Department of Education (2001). 
Furthermore, according to an Education Commission of the States (2004) report, the percentage 
of schools failing to make AYP in the 2002-03 school year varied from a low of 8% in Minnesota 
to a high of 87% in Florida. The report indicated that these disparities are due in large part to 
variation in standards and proficiency levels across states. 
 
12For a thorough discussion on the role of minimum n sizes and state accountability system design 
see deputy secretary Raymond Simon’s (2006) testimony before Committee on Education and the 
Workforce entitled, No Child Left Behind: Disaggregating Student Achievement by Subgroups to 
Ensure All Students Are Learning. 
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than that set by Texas’s Accountability Program and North Carolina’s ABC 
Accountability Plan. Additionally, consequences for schools that fail to meet AYP are 
much more severe under NCLB than those first imposed by precursor programs in Texas, 
North Carolina, and Florida. For these reasons, distributional effects resulting from 
NCLB may be greater than those detected by previous studies, necessitating 
requantification of potential tradeoffs within the context of NCLB. 
Fourth, there is considerable variation in the types of strategies for improving 
failing schools identified by districts. These strategies likely shape, in turn, the nature of 
school, principal, and teacher responses. For example, in 2005 the Center for Education 
Policy identified 18 different strategies in use by districts to improve failing schools, 
including: (a) use of student achievement data to inform instruction and other operational 
decisions, (b) reallocation of resources to support school improvement, (c) hiring of 
additional teachers to reduce class size, and/or (d) use of best practice research to inform 
decisions about improvement strategies (Center for Education Policy, 2005, p. 15). Some 
of these strategies may be considerably less vulnerable to the type of strategic resource-
allocation decision making that works against particular groups of students. 
Finally, present debate over achievement tradeoffs and NCLB tends to be 
informed by hyperbole and unfounded assertion. With congressional proceedings for 
NCLB’s reauthorization scheduled for 2007, the time is opportune to provide policy 
makers with sound empirical evidence as they seek to determine whether present 
accountability rules should be modified to reward gains across a wider spectrum of 
achievement, and whether gains of traditionally low-achieving students are occurring at 
the expense of other students. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
IDAHO’S STATEWIDE  
ASSESSMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRAM  
 
How schools respond to high-stakes minimum-competency accountability 
programs resides at the heart of the NCLB debate. Do schools behave strategically to 
incentives built into NCLB? Do decision makers allocate resources disproportionately to 
students on the margin of passing? Do these strategic resource allocation decisions occur 
at the expense of students at either tail of the achievement distribution? Do certain 
features of accountability better explain achievement tradeoffs than others? 
Despite the intensity and gravity of the NCLB debate as Congress approaches 
reauthorization proceedings in 2007, the resource allocation decision making of K-12 
public schools in response to strong incentives imbedded in high-stakes accountability 
programs continues to lack a well-defined theoretical foundation. Furthermore, the 
idiosyncratic nature of NCLB implementation across states adds an additional layer of 
complexity to efforts to define and quantify the relationship between incentive structures 
and achievement tradeoffs. As means to bring some clarity to this dynamic, this chapter 
examines the mechanics of Idaho’s Statewide Assessment and Accountability Program 
before briefly characterizing resource-allocation decision making by Idaho traditional 
public schools and public charter schools in response to ISAAP. 
 
 
 
 21
Idaho’s Statewide Assessment and Accountability Plan 
Designed to meet federal guidelines and regulations associated with NCLB, 
ISAAP was approved by the United States Department of Education (USDE) on June 10, 
2003. ISAAP’s genesis was a set of content and achievement standards established in 
1994, and subsequently revisited in 2000 and 2001, by the Idaho legislature, State Board 
of Education, and Citizen’s Commission on Assessment and Accountability. 
ISAAP holds all public schools13 in Idaho accountable on the following three 
dimensions: (a) proficiency scores in math, (b) proficiency scores in reading, and (c) 
minimum participation rates in testing. Under the system, schools must meet or exceed 
math and reading performance thresholds and minimum participation rates in and across 
10 student subgroups to avoid sanction.14 ISAAP’s minimum n for accountability 
purposes is 34 students. 
Table 1 displays ISAAP’s annual proficiency goals and the intermediate 
incremental percentage increase in the aggregate required of schools to reach 100% 
proficiency by the 2012-13 school year. During the 2002-03 school year, for instance, 
schools needed a minimum of 66% and 51% of students in each student subgroup to 
score proficient or better in reading and math, respectively, in order to make Adequate 
Yearly Progress. Annual proficiency goals for schools are calculated using a uniform 
averaging procedure across grade levels in a school. Schools are not held accountable for  
 
                                                 
13Idaho public schools are defined as those elementary and secondary schools established and 
maintained at public expense. 
 
14The 10 subgroups include: (a) all students, (b) African American, (c) Asian, (d) American 
Indian/Alaskan Native, (e) Hispanic, (r) White, (g) Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander, (h) students 
with disabilities, (i) limited English proficient, and (j) economically disadvantaged. 
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Table 1            
            
Annual Proficiency Goals and Intermediate Incremental Increase Required to Reach 100% Proficiency by 
the 2012-13 School Year 
                        
            
Goals 
2002-
03 
2003-
04
2004-
05
2005-
06
2006-
07
2007-
08
2008-
09
2009-
10
2010-
11
2011-
12
2012-
13
            
            
Reading            
Annual -- 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
Intermediate 66 66 72 72 78 78 84 84 92 92 100
            
Math            
Annual -- 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Intermediate 51 51 60 60 70 70 80 80 90 90 100
                        
 
 
student and student subgroup performance in individual grades. Furthermore, a minimum 
of 95% of students in each subgroup must be tested to avoid sanction. 
During the 2003-04 school year, Idaho entered into a flexibility agreement with 
the USDE whereby any school missing the 95% participation target would determine an 
adjusted participation rate by averaging its 2003-04 school year rate with that of the prior 
year. If the 2-year average was 95% or greater, the participation rate target for 2003-04 
was met. For the 2004-05 school year, and all years thereafter, a school seeking to 
average participation rate across years must include the three most recent years of data in 
their calculation (Idaho State Board of Education, 2006).  
ISAAP also holds all public schools accountable on a fourth dimension, 
generically labeled the “third indicator” by NCLB. For the 2002-03 and 2003-04 school 
years, Idaho’s third indicator was tied to proficiency in language usage for all students 
aggregated at the school level, but not by subgroup. Beginning in the 2004-05 school 
year, however, the language usage indicator was replaced by one of the following three 
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options chosen at the discretion of the school district: (a) increase percentage of students 
scoring advanced; (b) decrease percentage of students scoring below basic; or (c) 
demonstrate growth in student performance, as measured by a predetermined 
computerized remediation program (Idaho State Board of Education, 2006). The first two 
options apply both to math and to reading tests of the Idaho Standards Achievement Test 
(ISAT), whereas the third option is specific to the remediation program selected by the 
district. 
ISAAP measures student content knowledge and skill using an internet-enabled 
testing system called the Idaho Standards Achievement Test, which was developed by the 
Northwest Evaluation Association (NWEA), a national testing firm based out of Lake 
Oswego, Oregon. ISAT evaluates students in reading, math, and language arts and is 
scored on a single cross-grade and equal-interval scale ranging from 150 to 300 using the 
Rasch Unit (RIT) methodology (Cronin, Kingsbury, McCall, & Bowe, 2005). ISAT is 
administered to all public school students in grades 2 through 10 in the fall and spring.15 
Although scores are equated across grades, they are not equivalent across subjects. 
Spring ISAT results are compared to grade-specific benchmark scores to gauge 
whether a student, student subgroup, and school met ISAAP’s minimum proficiency 
standards. Both the student score required to be considered proficient and the percentage 
of students in a school needed to avoid ISAAP sanctions are delineated by content, grade, 
and level in Table 2. 
Figure 1 provides a brief description of ISAAP’s four prescribed levels of 
proficiency (i.e., below basic, basic, proficient, and advanced). A student must score at  
                                                 
15For information about the reliability, validity, and alignment of NWEA assessments see 
Northwest Evaluation Association’s (2004) report Reliability and Validity Estimates: NWEA 
Achievement Level Test and Measures of Academic Progress and Kingsbury (2003). 
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Table 2          
          
Approved Idaho Standards Achievement Test (ISAT) Proficiency Scores   
                    
          
 Grade 
   
          
ISAT 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
                    
          
Reading          
Basic 174 185 192 198 203 207 210 213 216
Proficient 182 193 200 206 211 215 218 221 224
Advanced 193 204 211 217 222 226 229 232 235
          
Language Arts          
Basic 176 186 193 200 204 207 211 213 214
Proficient 184 194 201 208 212 215 219 221 222
Advanced 197 207 214 221 225 228 232 234 235
          
Math          
Basic 174 185 194 202 208 214 222 229 231
Proficient 185 196 205 213 219 225 233 240 242
Advanced 201 212 221 229 235 241 249 256 258
                    
          
Note. Districts are permitted to impose more stringent proficiency standards. However, all districts are 
currently following these accountability standards. 
 
 
the “proficient” level or better to be considered passing. The math statewide percentage 
of proficient and advanced scoring students in grades 3 through 8 and 10 has ranged from 
a low of 53% for eighth-graders in 2003 to a high of 90.3% for fourth-graders in 2005. 
When pooling across grades and years approximately 75% of students score proficient or 
better on the spring math ISAT test.    
ISAAP motivates schools to meet minimum proficiency standards by imposing 
sanctions of increasing severity upon schools that fail to meet minimum proficiency 
targets for two consecutive years. If failing to make AYP for two consecutive years, a 
school will receive technical assistance from its district and must offer parents the option  
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ADVANCED: Exceeds Standards 
          
The student demonstrates thorough knowledge and mastery of skills that allows him/her 
to function independently above their current educational level. 
a) The student demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of all relevant information 
relevant to the topic at level. 
b) The student demonstrates comprehension and understanding of knowledge and skills 
above his/her grade level. 
c) The student can perform skills or processes independently without any significant 
errors. 
          
PROFICIENT: Meets Standards 
          
The student demonstrates mastery of knowledge and skills that allow him/her to function 
independently on all major concepts and skills related to their educational level. 
a) The student demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of all information relevant to 
the topic at level. 
b) The student can perform skills or processes independently without any significant 
errors. 
          
BASIC: Below Standards 
          
The student demonstrates basic knowledge and skills usage but cannot operate 
independently on concepts and skills related to his/her educational level. Requires 
remediation and assistance to complete tasks without significant errors. 
a) The student has an incomplete knowledge of the topic and/or misconceptions about 
some information. 
b) The student requires assistance and coaching to complete tasks without errors. 
          
BELOW BASIC: Critically Below Standards 
          
The student demonstrates significant lack of skills and knowledge and is unable to 
complete basic skills or knowledge sets without significant remediation. 
a) The student has critical deficiencies of relevant knowledge of topic and/or 
misconceptions about some information. 
b) The student cannot complete any skill set without significant assistance and coaching. 
                
        
Figure 1. Description of Idaho proficiency standards. 
 
 
to transfer their children to another public school, the transportation expense of which is 
born by the district. If choice is not an available option, a school must offer supplemental 
services, such as tutoring, after school classes, and summer classes, to eligible students in 
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reading and math.16 Technical assistance provisioned by the district may consist of school 
improvement planning and implementation, data analysis, identification and 
implementation of scientifically based instructional strategies, professional development, 
and budget analysis. Furthermore, the school must complete a 2-year school 
improvement plan for district review within 90 days of its identification as failing. 
If the same school fails to meet AYP the following year, the school must 
implement the intervention improvement plan developed in concert with its district the 
year prior, in addition to continuing to offer choice and supplemental services to eligible 
students. If failing to meet AYP for four consecutive years, the school is subject to 
corrective action. Under corrective action, the responsible district must enroll the school 
in a technical assistance program and/or implement at least one of the following seven 
courses of action: (a) provide to school staff appropriate, scientifically based professional 
development to elevate the achievement of low-performing students; (b) institute a new 
curriculum grounded in scientifically based research and provide appropriate professional 
development to support curriculum implementation; (c) extend the length of the school 
year or school day in an effort to improve instruction and increase student learning; (d) 
replace school staff deemed responsible for the school failing to make AYP; (e) 
significantly decrease management authority at the school; (f) restructure the internal 
organization of the school; or (g) appoint one or more external experts to advise the 
                                                 
16Regardless of Title I status, all schools are subject to sanction if they do not make AYP for two 
consecutive years. The sanctions to which non-Title I schools are subject differ from Title I 
schools only when a district permits a non-Title I school to offer computerized remediation 
programs, remedial online classes, after-school academic programs, or any other district-
sponsored remedial or tutoring services in place of supplemental services preapproved by the 
state. 
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school on its improvement plan and on the specific issues underlying the school’s 
continued failure to make AYP. 
In Year 5, a failing school must plan for restructuring, including providing 
teachers and parents opportunity to comment on and participate in development of a 
restructuring plan. A school’s restructuring incorporates at least one of the following five 
elements: (a) replacement of all or most of school staff; (b) contracting with an entity 
with a track record of effectiveness, such as a private management company, to assist in 
the continued operation of the school as a public concern; (c) turning operation of the 
school over to the state education agency; (d) reopening the school as a public charter 
school; or (e) implementation of any other major restructuring of school governance 
consistent with state-specified principles of restructuring. Figure 2 summarizes the 
schedule of sanctions under ISAAP for schools failing to make AYP.     
 
              
Years 1 & 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 
Alert Status 
Improve-
ment 1 
Improve-
ment 2 
Improve-
ment 3 
Improve-
ment 4 
Improve-
ment 5  
       
School on Technical Technical Technical Technical Technical School 
Alert Assistance Assistance Assistance Assistance Assistance Starts Over 
       
 School School School School School  
 Choice Choice Choice Choice Choice  
       
 Supplemental Supplemental Supplemental Supplemental Supplemental  
 Services Services Services Services Services  
       
 Create Implement Corrective Implement Implement  
 Improvement Improvement Action Corrective Restructuring  
 Plan Plan Planning Plan Planning  
       
    Restructuring   
    Planning   
       
       
Figure 2. Sanction schedule for schools failing to make Adequate Yearly Progress. 
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ISAAP also includes a “Safe Harbor” provision for schools and districts that are 
making progress in elevating student achievement but have not yet met prescribed 
proficiency targets. The provision is designed to prevent overidentification of failing 
schools. If a district or school misses a subgroup proficiency target in reading, math, or 
both subjects, it still can avoid sanction if: (a) the subgroup reduced the percentage of 
students below proficient by 10% when compared to the previous year; (b) the school as 
a whole, and each subgroup with 34 or more students, met the language arts goal; and (c) 
the school attained a 95% test participation rate (Idaho State Board of Education, 2006).  
Under ISAAP, schools may also be rewarded for elevating students’ academic 
achievement. The Idaho State Board of Education recognizes schools for academic 
excellence in two distinct manners: as “Distinguished Schools” and/or with Additional 
Yearly Growth (AYG) Awards. Schools gain eligibility for “distinguished” classification 
by being among the top 5% of schools exceeding AYP intermediate targets and by 
significantly reducing achievement gaps between student subgroups. For schools that 
have met AYP, eligibility for AYG awards entails demonstrating improved proficiency 
among student subgroups or by elevating school-level proficiency in the aggregate by 
greater than 10% in a given year. 
Of 705 Idaho schools that submitted reports for AYP determination during the 
2002-03 school year, 394 schools made all 41 goals, 212 schools missed at least one goal 
and did not make AYP, and 99 schools were not eligible for designation due to the Safe 
Harbor provision, minimum reporting requirements, or school type (Idaho State Board of 
Education, 2006). Of the 212 schools missing at least one goal, 50 schools failed reading 
but not math, 21 schools failed math but not reading, and 31 schools failed both subjects. 
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81 of these 212 schools failed at least one of the racial student subgroups in either math 
or reading, 38 of which failed in both subjects. Of the 81 schools failing at least one of 
the primary racial student subgroups (i.e., White, Hispanic, Native American, Black, and 
Asian), almost every school failed exclusively in the White and/or Hispanic subgroups. 
Schools failing in the Hispanic subgroup tended to fail more often in reading, while 
schools failing in the White subgroup, conversely, failed substantively more frequently in 
math. Lastly, 128 schools failed in the Free and Reduced Price Lunch student subgroup in 
either reading and/or math, 49 schools of which failed in reading alone, but only 15 
schools of which failed in just math.  
During the 2003-04 school year, and of 731 schools reporting AYP calculations, 
513 schools made all 41 goals, 111 schools missed at least one goal, and 117 schools 
were not eligible for designation. Of the 111 schools missing at least one goal, only 7 
schools failed reading but not math, only 3 schools failed math but not reading, and just 9 
schools failed both subjects; 69 of these 111 schools, however, failed at least one of the 
racial student subgroups in either math or reading, 40 of which failed in both subjects. Of 
the 69 schools failing at least one of the primary racial student subgroups (i.e., White, 
Hispanic, Native American, Black, and Asian), almost every school failed exclusively in 
the Hispanic subgroup. Schools failing in the Hispanic subgroup failed more often in 
Reading. Lastly, 68 schools failed in the Free and Reduced Price Lunch student subgroup 
in either reading and/or math, 35 schools of which failed in reading alone, but only 9 
schools of which failed in just math.  
Following high-stakes testing in the spring of the 2004-05 school year, 345 
schools of 752 reporting made all 41 goals, 259 schools failed to make AYP, and 149 
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schools were exempted. Of the 259 schools missing at least one goal, 25 schools failed 
reading but not math, 18 schools failed math but not reading, and 29 schools failed both 
subjects; 121 of these schools failed at least one of the racial student subgroups in either 
math or reading, 69 of which failed in both subjects. Of the 121 schools failing at least 
one of the primary racial student subgroups (i.e., White, Hispanic, Native American, 
Black, and Asian), almost every school failed exclusively in the Hispanic subgroup, 
although the number of schools failing AYP in the White student subgroup did rise 
slightly from the 2003-04 school year. The difference in the number of schools failing in 
the Hispanic subgroup in reading versus math grew substantially in the 2004-2005 school 
year. Lastly, 159 schools failed in the Free and Reduced Price Lunch student subgroup in 
either reading and/or math, 75 schools of which failed in reading alone, but only 22 
schools of which failed in just math.  
 
Characterizing ISAAP-Induced Resource-Allocation Decisions 
By building upon theoretical and empirical discussions found in pre-NCLB 
research,17 and by borrowing insight from economic and psychological theory,18 this 
section briefly characterizes resource-allocation decision making by schools in response 
to ISAAP. When an accountability system such as ISAAP is implemented, schools are 
                                                 
17Specifically, this framework builds upon work by Deere and Strayer (2001), Holmes (2003), 
Reback (2006), and Chakrabarti (2006), and draws from an international study by Burgess, 
Propper, Slater, and Wilson (2005) that examines the impact of the United Kingdom’s 
accountability program on the distribution of student gains following implementation in 1988. 
 
18Although economic and psychological perspectives on schooling may appear an unlikely match, 
MacPhail-Wilcox (1988, p. 233) insightfully argues: “They are disciplines with similar goals, 
kindred concepts, and related propositions. Economists investigate ways that resources are 
allocated to satisfy human wants, and motivation scholars identify the needs undergirding wants 
and the processes that activate and sustain behavior. Both seek to explain how these phenomena 
affect satisfaction, behavior, and productivity.” 
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motivated to focus resources on high-stakes activities and students on the threshold of 
passing. As the likelihood grows that the total percentage of any one subgroup is below 
state-defined proficiency standards, so too does the worth of focusing resources on these 
students to the school. Concomitantly, there is a limit to this notion, particularly in that 
schools may shift resources away from habitually low-performing students. Nonetheless, 
if a school believes it can make AYP, and penalty aversion is a significant factor, then 
schools will change behavior, particularly when resource constrained. 
I predict a shift of resources away from students at either tail of the achievement 
distribution and toward marginal students, under the hypothesis that devoting resources 
well above or well below the passing threshold will have very small marginal effects on 
the likelihood of a school making AYP. Under this premise, the frequency and magnitude 
of the low-/high-achievement tradeoff is a function both of whether a school failed to 
meet ISAAP defined proficiency standard in the prior year and of how much effort might 
need be expended by that school to reach proficiency, as defined and measured by how 
far the marginal student in each of the school’s one or more failing student subgroups is 
from reaching the ISAAP-defined proficiency standard in a particular year. 
Schools not subject to AYP determination under NCLB’s Safe Harbor provision 
are likely to respond strategically in a manner similar to that of failing schools not 
seeking or ineligible for Safe Harbor exemption. Eligibility for Safe Harbor designation 
necessitates that schools decrease the percentage of students in the nonproficient student 
subgroup by 10% from the preceding school year on both reading and mathematics 
indicators. As a consequence, one might argue that a serially underperforming school 
with little prospect of reaching proficiency in the near term has equal, if not greater, 
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incentive to improve the performance of marginal students, or risks losing Safe Harbor 
eligibility, failing AYP, and becoming subject to NCLB sanctions. While Idaho does not 
report specifically which schools avoided failing status through Safe Harbor exemption, I 
am able to capture these schools in the greater pool of failing schools by calculating the 
yearly performance of each school’s applicable student subgroups in relation to the 
ISAAP-defined proficiency standard. Nevertheless, the overall number of schools 
exempted under Safe Harbor as a percentage of total failing schools appears small. In 
2004, for instance, Idaho reported that the number of schools identified for school 
improvement reduced by approximately 3.5%, or 4 about schools, following the state’s 
granting of Safe Harbor exemptions. 
In either scenario, whether that of the school close to passing AYP or that of the 
serially underperforming school seeking to decrease its percentage of failing students per 
annum, this characterization of ISAAP-induced resource-allocation decision making 
assumes that schools: (a) respond strategically to high-stakes accountability programs, (b) 
are both well-informed and well-intentioned in their resource decision making, and (c) 
face resource constraints. Expectancy theory, psychology’s classical behaviorist model of 
motivation, offers an extensive empirical research base on why and how individuals and 
organizations respond to incentives. Expectancy theory states that individuals react to 
external stimuli such as sanctions, and that individual responses are a product of 
personality, skills, knowledge, experience, ability, and so forth (Vroom, 1964).19 Past 
                                                 
19More specifically, expectancy theory is composed of three elements: expectancy probability, 
instrumentality probability, and valence. Expectancy probability (EÆP) is the belief that one’s 
effort (E) will result in attainment of desired performance (P) goals. Instrumentality probability 
(PÆR) is the belief that if one does meet performance (P) goals, he or she will receive a greater 
reward (R). Valence (V(R)) is the value (V) an individual places on the reward (R). Ultimately, 
Vroom (1964) and others suggests that valence x (expectancy (instrumentality)) = motivation. 
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research suggests incentives are highly effective in motivating behavior, even when 
employees are strongly intrinsic (Locke & Latham, 1990; Mohrman & Lawler, 1996), 
while a growing body of educational accountability research indicates that schools act 
strategically in response to high-stakes accountability programs (see, e.g., Chakrabarti, 
2006; Figlio, 2005; Jacob & Levitt, 2003; Reback, 2006). 
The informational immediacy and transparency of ISAAP’s reporting system 
provides support for the argument that schools are capable of making knowledge-based 
resource-allocation decisions. All ISAT results are reported to teachers, schools, and 
districts within 72 hours of test administration in the fall and spring (Northwest 
Evaluation Association, 2006). Moreover, NWEA’s testing system automatically 
analyzes data prior to release, providing schools, administrators, and teachers with 
percentile rank, achievement score, projected proficiency on state tests, and year-over-
year test score growth for each student following administration of the fall and spring 
tests (Northwest Evaluation Association, 2006). These data and information enable a 
school to gauge how each student and student subgroup performs in relation to ISAAP’s 
minimum competency standards and to make informed resource-allocation decisions in 
response to ISAAP proficiency standards within the first few weeks of the school year. 
This research may not detect a tradeoff, though, if a school becomes more 
efficient by substituting resources across outcomes. Education is a complex and 
multidimensional enterprise (Baker, 1992; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991), and ISAAP 
does not encompass all relevant activities of the state’s education system.20 For instance, 
ISAAP holds schools accountable in math, reading, and language arts, but not science, 
                                                 
20Prendergast (1999, p. 21) noted that, “The use of explicit contracts could cause agents to focus 
too much on those aspects of the job included in the contract to the detriment of those that are 
excluded.” 
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social studies, and so forth. As such, schools may focus additional resources on high-
stakes tests and subjects (i.e., math, reading, and language arts) to the detriment of low-
stakes activities (Center for Education Policy, 2005; Chakrabarti, 2006; Deere & Strayer, 
2001).21 
Schools also may become more efficient by tracking students by ability. As first 
noted in Deere and Strayer (2001), a principle assumption in the study of achievement 
tradeoffs is that curriculum will focus on the least rigorous portion of content tested and 
required to meet proficiency thresholds because the marginal gain in the passing rate 
from teaching more advanced material will be small. If schools are not restricted to 
offering the same instruction to all students in the same classroom, then tradeoffs may not 
be evident when measured by the distribution of student achievement. Of course, this 
solution assumes schools can easily track students or differentiate the curriculum, and do 
so without incurring additional cost. 
It is also possible that districts and/or private foundations provide resource 
support to schools designated as needing improvement. Schools could use these 
additional resources to hire more teachers or extend the school day. If schools receiving 
additional district-level or private foundational resources use these resources to avoid 
ISAAP sanction, distributional effects may be dampened.  
 
                                                 
21Future iterations of this research will be able to examine if Idaho public schools reduce 
instruction in low-stakes subjects when data for the 2005-06 school year become available. In 
2005, Idaho entered into a flexibility agreement with the US Department of Education that 
permits districts to alter accountability program features required under NCLB. Specifically, the 
language arts portion of the ISAT was a high-stakes exam in Idaho for 3 years (i.e., 2002-03, 
2003-04, 2004-05 school years). Starting in the 2005-06 school year, however, the language arts 
test was replaced by state-defined student growth measures. To test for a subject tradeoff one can 
compare achievement before and after Idaho entered into flexibility agreement. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DATA SOURCES, DATA  
DEVELOPMENT, AND ESTIMATION STRATEGIES 
 
NWEA’s Growth Research Database 
The primary data for this study are drawn from NWEA’s Growth Research 
Database (GRD), a data system that collects longitudinal student-level achievement 
results from approximately 2,200 school districts in 45 states. The GRD assessment 
system, as described by Cronin et al. (2005), is a rich database for educational policy 
research considering:     
All scores for the NWEA assessment in a subject area reference a single, cross-
grade, equal-interval scale developed using Item Response Theory methodology.  
. . . The RIT scale is designed to measure student growth and performance across 
time as well as to take advantage of strong measurement theory and experimental 
design, and have been demonstrated to be extremely stable over twenty years of 
development and use (Kingsbury, 2003). This stability holds for each subject area 
measurement scale (reading, mathematics and language usage) and across grades 
levels from 3 to 8 within subjects (Northwest Evaluation Association, 2002). (p. 
16) 
 
Starting with the 2002-03 school year, NWEA’s GRD contains test score 
information for over 90% of Idaho students in mathematics, reading, and language arts. 
GRD assigns each student a unique identifier as long as the student is enrolled in Idaho’s 
public school system. This tracking mechanism offers researchers access to multiple 
observations on each individual student in the sample and opportunity to construct a 
panel dataset. GRD also contains demographic and other relevant information on students 
and schools, including race/ethnicity, gender, free and reduced price lunch status, grade, 
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date of birth, school type, and school size. School finance data, however, are not 
available. 
 
Data Development 
Development of the data included selecting eligible schools and students. GRD 
contains demographic information and ISAT scores for students in traditional public 
schools, nontraditional public schools (e.g., students enrolled in charter or virtual/on-line 
schools), and private schools (e.g., Catholic, other religious, and nonreligious). Eligible 
cases were restricted to students enrolled in traditional public schools or public charter 
schools because private schools are not held accountable under ISAAP. 
There are 51 schools in Idaho for which the total tested student population is less 
than ISAAP’s minimum prescribed n of 34. Under ISAAP, AYP for these schools is 
calculated using 3 years of achievement data to obtain a more consistent and reliable 
determination due to their small sample size. These unusually small schools were 
eliminated, resulting in exclusion of a total of 727, 730, and 708 student observations for 
the 2002-03, 2003-04 and 2004-05 school years, respectively. 
Reconfigured schools were also deleted from the sample. ISAAP does not hold 
reconfigured schools accountable until 3 full years of achievement data is collected. 
Across all 3 years, there were a total of 10 reconfigurations, or eight school 
consolidations and two school deconsolidations. Eliminating these schools reduced the 
total number of student observations by 1,921, or approximately 1% percent of all 
traditional public school and charter school students in grades three through eight. 
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Eligible student observations were restricted to students enrolled in grades three 
through eight because grades above and below this band are not subject to sanction under 
ISAAP. The dependent variable relies on a fall-to-spring student gain score; therefore, 
students without both fall and spring RIT scores in a given school year were excluded 
from analysis. This restriction was also placed on data in light of the fact that Section 
112.03 of Idaho’s Administrative Procedures Act requires that only students who are 
continuously enrolled in the same public school from the end of the first 8 weeks, or 56 
calendar days, of the school year through the spring test administration period be 
included in AYP calculations. While coding procedures employed are not based on 
student attendance patterns as defined in Section 112.03, this restriction is believed to 
produce a closer approximation to actual AYP calculations. In total, these restrictions 
eliminated less than 17,500 student observations, or an average of 5.5% of student 
observations per year. Moreover, results are robust to estimation of tradeoffs when 
including non-full-year students in school-level proficiency calculations. 
Because estimates might be influenced by atypical values, outliers were flagged 
according to the following algorithm. For each school, the first (Q1) and third (Q3) 
quartile values were identified for a given variable, and any value that was 1.5 IQR below 
Q1 or 1.5 above Q3 was flagged as suspicious value. Values that were 3 IQR below Q1 
or 3 IQR above Q3 were flagged as extreme outliers. Results are robust to estimation of 
tradeoffs when removing no outliers, when removing only extreme values, or when 
removing both suspicious and extreme values.  
To investigate data reliability following cleaning and development procedures, 
resultant student achievement descriptive statistics were compared to reported values 
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published in a biannual series of statewide results brochures maintained by the Idaho 
State Board of Education (ISBE). These comparisons are reported in Table 3.  
 
Table 3            
             
Comparison of RIT Scores Calculated Post-Data-Development to RIT Scores Reported by Idaho State 
Department of Education 
                          
             
 Fall 2002 Spring 2003 Fall 2003 Spring 2004 Fall 2004 Spring 2005 
                         
             
Grade 
Calcu-
lated 
Report-
ed 
Calcu-
lated 
Report-
ed 
Calcu-
lated 
Report-
ed 
Calcu-
lated 
Report-
ed 
Calcu-
lated 
Report-
ed 
Calcu-
lated 
Report-
ed 
                          
             
3 189.9 189.8 202.1 202.1 192.8 192.7 204.9 205.0 194.1 194.1 204.7 204.8 
4 200.4 200.3 211.6 211.7 202.6 202.5 214.6 214.6 204.1 204.0 216.2 216.3 
5 208.8 208.5 216.6 216.6 209.2 209.1 219.8 219.8 212.6 212.4 221.3 221.4 
6 215.1 214.9 223.7 223.7 217.1 216.9 226.3 226.3 219.2 219.1 225.8 225.9 
7 222.6 222.3 229.0 228.9 224.1 223.7 230.7 230.7 225.9 225.8 232.3 232.4 
8 229.2 228.7 234.0 233.9 230.1 229.7 237.2 237.2 231.6 231.3 237.8 237.9 
                          
 
 
 Between 83% and 86% of third- through eighth-grade students are White. 
Between 11% and 15% are Hispanic or Latino, and the remaining 3% are Black/African 
American, Asian/Pacific Islander, or American Indian/Native Alaskan. Between 34% and 
40% of students were identified as economically disadvantaged during the spring 
semester as defined by free and reduced price lunch status. The fall-to-spring gain score 
in math has a mean of 8.91 points with a standard deviation of 6.92 points when pooled 
across all grades and years. These sample means are weighted by the number of 
students at each campus who take the ISAT.  
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Measuring Low-/High-Achievement Tradeoffs 
Three previous research studies examined systematic shifts in intraschool 
resource-distribution patterns in response to high-stakes accountability programs using a 
student gain score as the dependent variable.22 Deere and Strayer (2001) and Holmes 
(2003) constructed a student gain measure using student test score changes from time t+1 
to t+2 on the left-hand side of the equation where both time periods represent spring test 
administrations. Isolating student gain on the left-hand side of the equation is an 
attractive approach in that the difference between the two measurement errors is picked 
up by the disturbance term. 
Reback (2006) advanced Deere and Strayer (2001) and Holmes’s (2003) 
specification by developing a student gain score that compared a student’s performance 
to typical gains at that particular point in the achievement distribution. He converted each 
student’s test score to a Z-score based on the performance of a student in the same grade 
with an identical score from the previous year. Reback (2006) argued that this 
specification was superior to that of Deere and Strayer (2001) and Holmes (2003) 
because results were robust to the influence of mean reversion. In comparing a student to 
peers with the same initial score, Reback controlled for the amount of mean reversion 
expected from this group of students. Once a student’s test-score gain was measured in 
relation to peers in the same group, the amount of mean reversion that group might have 
exhibited in comparison to other groups was no longer an issue. 
                                                 
22Other studies examining subgroup-level data have estimated shifts in the percentage of students 
scoring in different performance levels within and between failing schools and nonfailing schools 
(Chakrabarti, 2006), or the second difference in average pass rates pre- and post-NCLB (Ballou, 
Liu, & Rolle, 2005). An international study by Burgess et al. (2005) examined the difference 
between a student’s test score at age 16 and at age 14 where age 14 test score was used as a 
regressor. 
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While these studies all identified viable options for constructing a dependent 
variable capable of capturing a low-/high-achievement tradeoff, this dissertation employs 
an alternative approach. ISAT is administered twice per year, allowing for construction of 
a fall-to-spring gain score for each individual student in the 2002-03, 2003-04, and 2004-
05 school years. A fall-to-spring gain score is advantageous because spring-to-spring gain 
scores have the confounding influence of the summer months, meaning that any gain (or 
potential loss) in a student’s ISAT score due to what the school provided cannot be 
disentangled easily from how much gain (or loss) occurred as a result of summer 
activities.23  
This dissertation also generates a standardized fall-to-spring test-score gain for 
each student based on a comparison of a student’s nominal gain and the average gain in 
achievement for all students in Idaho by applicable year and grade. Similar to the 
approach employed in Texas charter school research by Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin, and 
Branch (2005) and Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg, and Jansen (2006), the initial 
achievement distribution in Idaho is defined by fall ISAT score and divided into 20 equal 
intervals for each unique combination of year and grade. The mean and standard 
deviation test-score gain for all students starting in a particular interval for each unique 
combination of year and grade are then computed. The standard fall-to-spring test-score 
gain for each student is calculated as the difference between that student’s nominal gain 
and the mean gain of all students in the interval over the standard deviation of all student 
gains in the interval. Gains in each interval are therefore distributed with a mean of zero 
and standard deviation of one. Ultimately, this standardization of gains allows me to test 
                                                 
23Alexander, Entwisle, and Olson (2001) used hierarchical growth models to demonstrate the 
seasonality of children’s learning over the school year and summer months. 
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whether the model specifications using the unstandardized fall-to-spring test-score gains 
are robust to bias resulting from mean reversion. 
 
Measuring a School’s Short-Run Incentive to Target Resources 
The incentive structure embedded in NCLB-mandated state accountability 
programs has led some to claim that students that could most influence a school’s AYP 
rating will receive a greater proportion of educational resources, especially if the total 
percentage of any one subgroup is below state-defined proficiency standards. Without 
taking into consideration a school’s short-run incentive to target instruction, research 
studies seeking to quantify the magnitude and frequency of the low-/high-achievement 
tradeoff will underestimate strategic resource-allocation decisions made in response to 
high-stakes accountability.24 Unfortunately, there are no definitive constructs that 
indicate a school’s short-run incentive to target particular students. 
Holmes (2003) was the first researcher to construct an indicator for measuring a 
teacher’s incentive to target instruction in response to high-stakes accountability systems. 
Holmes’ strategy consisted of two components. First, he calculated how each student’s 
predicted test score fell from the state accountability system’s defined performance 
target. Second, he calculated the importance to a school of getting a particular student 
over the performance target. Then to identify a student’s relative importance, Holmes 
                                                 
24Since ISAAP was implemented statewide in 2002 there are no true counterfactuals against 
which to compare schools’ strategic resource-allocation decision making. Investigating the 
impact of ISAAP’s incentive structure on resource-allocation practices requires examining natural 
variation found within Idaho’s K-12 school system. However, as noted by Reback (2006), 
because all schools are exposed to the accountability program, results may actually underestimate 
distributional effects as schools seek to make permanent changes to raise pass rates, regardless of 
short-run incentives. This effect may be intensified by NCLB’s goal toward 100% proficiency by 
the 2012-13 school year. 
 42
determined the underlying distribution of student quality in a school and then situated 
each student on this continuum based upon their predicted spring achievement in 
relations to North Carolina’s accountability system and defined performance thresholds.   
Holmes, however, imposed a fixed bandwidth value that restricted the estimated 
degree of resource targeting at the school level. Despite estimating that some schools 
must target students 20 units below the performance threshold, Holmes restricted the 
maximum distance a “targeted” student could fall from the performance threshold to 5 
units below the performance standard. This restriction biases resultant estimates of 
whether schools target resources to marginal students.  
Burgess et al. (2005) estimated the impact of the proportion of marginal students 
in a school on the achievement gains of traditionally low-performing students in the 
United Kingdom. For each student observation, they interacted the proportion of 
marginal students in a school with an indicator variable that took the value of 1 if the 
student’s ability was considered low. The coefficient on the conditioning effect reflected 
the impact of the United Kingdom’s accountability policy. Burgess et al.’s strategy was 
limited, however, in that their low-performing student dummy was based on a non-high-
stakes test taken by students at age 14, while their dependent variable of interest were 
results from a high-stakes test taken at age 16.  
Reback (2006) developed a more complex technique for estimating a school’s 
incentive to improve the expected performance of certain students. He estimated the 
marginal effect of a hypothetical improvement in the expected performance of a 
particular student on the probability that a school would obtain a certain accountability 
rating. Reback’s indicator permitted him to test whether students earned higher than 
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expected test score gains when schools were subject to stronger short-run incentives to 
focus effort and resources on marginally performing students. 
This dissertation constructs a series of indicator variables to measure whether a 
particular student is likely to be targeted. The first indicator variable constructed, 
)1(.. −tijMISATF , is a dummy variable denoting whether a student failed the fall 
administration of the ISAT math test. Failure is defined as any score below the state-
defined proficiency standard for that student’s particular grade and year combination. 
Approximately 50% of all fall test takers did not meet grade specific performance 
threshold.  
)1(... −tijADJMISATF , an adjusted version of the first indicator variable, is a 
dummy variable denoting whether a student that failed fall administration of the ISAT 
math test was expected to pass the test’s spring administration by making normal gains 
over the school year. Using the average fall-to-spring gain for each grade, this adjustment 
helps reclassify as passing those failing students in the fall who were unlikely to be 
targeted with resources given expectations of meeting the state-defined proficiency 
standard in the spring. Approximately 73% of all test takers were expected to pass the 
spring ISAT after taking into consideration average expected gains.   
The second indicator variable constructed, )1(.. −tijMGAPST , uses the distance of a 
student’s score from the state-defined passing threshold to indicate the probability that a 
school overlooks that student. )1(.. −tijMGAPST  is defined as the gap between the passing 
threshold and a student’s test score. For example, if the state-defined proficiency standard 
is 50 and a particular student in the fourth grade receives a 55 on the test, the student is 
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assigned a value of 5 for )1(.. −tijMGAPST . The average )1(.. −tijMGAPST  value across all 
years and grades was 3.36.  
)1(... −tijADJMGAPST , an adjusted version of the second indicator variable, takes 
into consideration a student’s expected fall-to-spring test-score gain in a particular grade. 
)1(... −tijADJMGAPST  denotes the gap between the passing threshold and a student’s test 
score after adjusting for whether that student is expected to pass the spring administration 
of the ISAT math test by making normal gains over the year. For example, assuming then 
that fourth graders were expected to gain 3 points on average between the fall and spring, 
a student with an )1(.. −tijMGAPST  value of 5 would be assigned a value of 2 for 
)1(... −tijADJMGAPST . The average )1(... −tijADJMGAPST  value is .40.  
)1(.. −tijMGAPST  and )1(... −tijADJMGAPST , however, impose a strong assumption; 
that being, increased gains of a student who starts 20 points below the cut-off equals the 
amount by which the gain will diminish when a student starts 20 points above the cut-off. 
By imposing such a strong assumption on the relationship of MGAPST ..  and 
MADJGAPST ... to student gains, the estimates are likely to be biased. Therefore, 
)1(... −tijMPASSGAPST  and )1(... −tijMFAILGAPST  are created to relax this assumption. 
)1(... −tijMPASSGAPST  is defined as the gap between the passing threshold and a student’s 
test score that passes the fall ISAT. )1(... −tijMFAILGAPST  is defined as the gap between 
the passing threshold and a student’s test score that failed the fall ISAT. These variables 
are also modeled after adjusting for average gain by grade and year.  
This dissertation relies on a single indicator, jtMPROFF .. , to capture a school’s 
incentive to target instruction. This indicator, and the third constructed, is a dummy 
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variable denoting whether a school met ISAAP’s minimum proficiency standard. 
jtMPROFF ..  replicates ISAAP’s proficiency standard calculations under ISAAP by 
determining whether each traditional public school, and all defined subgroups therein, 
met the state-prescribed proficiency threshold in each of the 3 years represented in the 
panel following administration of the ISAT math test in the spring. This approach helps 
account for the potential presence of achievement tradeoffs both in Safe Harbor schools 
that must act strategically in the short run to increase the percentage of students scoring at 
or above proficiency by 10% year-over-year and in schools where the size of certain 
failing subgroups fluctuates around minimum n size of 34, thereby making that 
subgroup’s continued exemption from AYP designation an uncertainty and preserving the 
school’s incentive to elevate the performance of students at or near the proficiency cut-
off. Four different versions of the third indicator were constructed using minimum n 
thresholds of 34, 32, 28, and zero students. Each construction yielded similar results in 
cross-wise comparisons.  
A final variable is used to denote whether a student in the subgroup for which a 
school failed to meet proficiency. The variables are identified as MHISPSUBF ...  and 
MWHITESUBF ... . Variables are limited to White and Hispanic subgroups because 
approximately 96% of all Idaho students are either White or Hispanic and AYP 
determination for non-White or non-Hispanic subgroups effects less than 3% of 
traditional Idaho public schools.  
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Other Factors Influencing the Low-/High-Achievement Tradeoff 
Mediating factors may explain further why one student category is rewarded at 
the expense of another in the resource-allocation decision-making process. In particular, 
this dissertation examines if the outcome of a low-/high-achievement tradeoff varies 
depending upon: (a) the severity of sanction faced by a school, (b) whether a student is in 
a terminal grade, (c) whether a student is in more than one failing subgroup, and (d) 
differences in market sensitivity among traditional public and public charter schools. 
 
Severity of Sanction 
NCLB monitors schools’ progress toward meeting academic “proficiency” 
through AYP calculations and motivates them to meet minimum proficiency standards by 
imposing sanctions of increasing severity for failure to meet AYP. Schools may avoid 
being labeled as failing AYP, however, by (a) reducing the percentage of students below 
proficient by 10% when compared to the previous year, (b) meeting the language arts 
proficiency goal, and (c) maintaining a 95% test participation rate (Idaho State Board of 
Education, 2006). Additionally, subgroups with less than 34 students are not held 
accountable. 
Given that the severity of these sanctions varies across schools, this dissertation 
creates two dummy variables to denote the school improvement status of a “failing” 
school, defined herein as a school that failed to meet the prescribed proficiency target in 
at least one of the 10 subgroups designated under ISAAP following administration of the 
ISAT math test in the fall and/or spring of the prior year. jtYIMPSCH ..  equals 1 if a 
school failed to meet state-defined proficiency standard in at least 1 year, and 0 if a 
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school met proficiency in all years; jtYYIMPSCH ..  equals 1 if a school failed to meet 
proficiency in two consecutive schools years and 0 if a school met proficiency in all 
years. It is hypothesized that a school’s investment in marginal students will increase 
with each additional and successive failure to meet proficiency. 
 
Terminal Versus Nonterminal Grade 
As noted in Chapter II, and discussed in previous research (Deere & Strayer, 
2001; Reback, 2006), the estimation strategy assumes that a school’s response to ISAAP 
is a “one year optimization problem.” That is, in order to avoid sanction, schools are only 
concerned with allocation of resources to elevate the performance of marginal students in 
a single year. In reality, schools likely invest in certain students over a multi-year period.  
To examine if schools indeed respond strategically to the period for which a 
school is held accountable for a student’s academic performance, this dissertation 
compares student achievement gains in terminal and nonterminal grades. A binary 
indicator variable, )1( +tijTRMGRD , takes the value of 1 if student i in school j is in a 
terminal grade in the spring, or 0 if the student is not. If schools indeed employ a “one 
year optimization” strategy in response to ISAAP, then one would expect to detect no 
difference in the performance of marginal students in terminal grades relative to that of 
marginal students in nonterminal grades. Conversely, if schools are more likely to invest 
more heavily in students for which they are accountable for extended periods of time, 
then one might expect to detect instances of marginal students in terminal grades 
underperforming in relation to marginal peers in nonterminal grades. Given that Idaho 
holds all subgroups accountable for the failing performance of any subgroup in the prior 
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year, the latter scenario seems less likely, and one would expect any evidence of this 
effect to be random and isolated.25 
 
Students in Overlapping Categories 
ISAAP holds schools accountable for student performance in 10 subgroup 
categories. However, subgroup classifications are not mutually exclusive. Schools with 
economically disadvantaged, limited English proficient, and/or disabled students are held 
accountable for the performance of these students across at least three dimensions–the 
“all students” subgroup, a “race/ethnicity” subgroup, and at least one of the three 
aforementioned subgroup classifications. If a school faces the threat of sanctions due to 
the performance of White and economically disadvantaged students in math, for instance, 
it is hypothesized then that low-income White students will be targeted more than 
affluent White students or non-White low-income students. 
 
Market Sensitivity of Public Charter Schools 
This dissertation also compares strategic resource decision-making practices 
within and between traditional public schools and public charter schools. Charter schools 
are held accountable under NCLB, and hence subject to the same sanctions as traditional 
public schools. Thus, there are incentives for charter schools to engage in the same 
strategic tradeoffs as regular public schools. However, charter schools, by virtue of 
                                                 
25Reback (2006) conducted a similar analysis, concluding: “The effect of the incentive for a 
school to improve the math performance of particular students is more than twice as large among 
students in the terminal grades of their schools. In addition, relatively high achieving students in 
terminal grades are much more significantly hurt by having many classmates who could influence 
the school’s rating that year. Similarly, the lowest achieving students in terminal grades are 
helped far less than usual when they have many classmates who could influence the school’s 
rating that year” (p. 22). 
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funding and enrollment policy, are more market sensitive than their traditional public 
school counterparts, a condition that may attenuate allocation of resources to particular 
groups of students. A binary indicator variable, ijtCHARTER , takes the value of 1 if a 
school is a public charter school or a value of 0 if a school is a traditional public school. 
 
Estimation Strategy 
The basic general linear model is specified as follows. Let )1( −−=∆ tijijtijt YYY  be 
the math test-score gain for student i in school j from fall to spring administration of 
ISAT, where t denotes spring administration of the test. Then   
.
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The value on 1α  represents the difference between the average fall-to-spring test-
score gain in math for passing non-Hispanic and passing non-White students enrolled in 
schools that failed to meet ISAAP’s proficiency standard in math in at least one student 
subgroup the previous spring and the average fall-to-spring test-score gain in math for 
passing non-Hispanic and passing non-White students enrolled in schools that did meet 
the standard. The sign on 1α  indicates the direction in which the average test-score gain 
of passing non-Hispanic and passing non-White students enrolled in failing schools 
differed from that of racially similar passing students enrolled in passing schools. A 
negative sign on 1α  coefficient that is statistically different from zero denotes a tradeoff 
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whereby passing non-Hispanic and passing non-White students enrolled in failing schools 
gained less than passing non-Hispanic and passing non-White students enrolled in 
passing schools. 
The value on 2α  represents the difference between the average fall-to-spring test-
score gain in math for passing Hispanic students enrolled in schools that met ISAAP’s 
proficiency standard in math the previous spring and the average fall-to-spring test-score 
gain in math for passing non-Hispanic and non-White students also enrolled in schools 
that met the standard. The sign on 2α  indicates the direction in which the gains of 
passing Hispanic students enrolled in passing schools differed from those of passing non-
Hispanic and non-White students also enrolled in passing schools. A negative sign on the 
2α  coefficient that is statistically different from zero denotes that passing non-Hispanic 
and non-White students in passing schools gained more on average than similarly situated 
passing Hispanic students. 
The value on 3α  represents the difference between the average fall-to-spring test-
score gain in math for passing White students enrolled in schools that met ISAAP’s 
proficiency standard in math the previous spring and the average fall-to-spring test-score 
gain in math for passing non-Hispanic and non-White students also enrolled in schools 
that met the standard. The sign on 3α  indicates the direction in which the gains of 
passing White students enrolled in passing schools differed from those of passing non-
Hispanic and non-White students also enrolled in passing schools. A negative sign on the 
3α  coefficient that is statistically different from zero denotes that passing non-Hispanic 
and non-White students gained more on average than similarly situated passing White 
students. 
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The value on 4α , identified by ijttj MHISPSUBFMPROFF ..... )2( ×− , represents 
whether the average test-score gain in math of passing Hispanic students enrolled in 
schools that failed to meet ISAAP’s proficiency standard in math due to poor 
performance by Hispanic students the previous spring differed from that of passing non-
Hispanic and non-White students also enrolled in failing schools, save for those schools 
with a failing Hispanic and/or White subgroup. A positive and statistically significant 
value on 4α  indicates greater gains on average by passing Hispanic students in schools 
with a failing Hispanic subgroup than by passing non-Hispanic and non-White students 
enrolled in schools with non-Hispanic and non-White failing subgroups. 
The value on 5α , identified by ijttj MWHITESUBFMPROFF ..... )2( ×− , represents 
whether the average test-score gain in math of passing White students enrolled in schools 
that failed to meet ISAAP’s proficiency standard in math due to poor performance by 
White students the previous spring differed from that of passing non-Hispanic and non-
White students also enrolled in failing schools, save for those schools with a failing 
Hispanic and/or White subgroup. A positive and statistically significant value on 5α  
indicates greater gains on average by passing White students in schools with a failing 
White subgroup than by passing non-Hispanic and non-White students enrolled in 
schools with non-Hispanic and non-White failing subgroups. 
The value on 6α , identified by )1()2( .... −− × tijtj MISATFMPROFF , represents 
whether the average test-score gain in math of failing non-Hispanic and non-White 
students enrolled in failing schools, save for failure by Hispanic and/or White subgroup, 
differed from that of passing non-Hispanic and non-White students also enrolled in 
failing schools, save for failure by Hispanic and/or White subgroup. A positive and 
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statistically significant value on 6α  indicates greater gains on average in math by failing 
non-Hispanic and non-White students enrolled in failing schools, save for failure by 
Hispanic and/or White subgroup, than by similarly-situated and passing non-Hispanic 
and non-White students. 
However, the values on these latter three interactions do not explicitly explain the 
issue of interest, namely if schools responded to ISAAP’s incentive structure by targeting 
resources to failing students in failing subgroups. To provide a more refined specification 
of resource targeting, this model includes a Student X Subgroup conditioning effect. This 
three-way interaction permits examination of whether Idaho schools responded to ISAAP 
by targeting resources to failing students in failing subgroups at the expense of similarly 
situated peers who met proficiency. 
The value on 7α , identified by )1()2( ....... −− ×× tijijttj MISATFMHISPSUBFMPROFF ,  is 
the Failing Student X Hispanic Subgroup interaction. 7α  represents whether the average 
test-score gain in math of failing Hispanics students enrolled in schools that failed to 
meet ISAAP proficiency standards due to failing math performance by Hispanic 
subgroup differed from the average test-score gain in math of (a) passing Hispanic 
students also enrolled in schools that failed due to failing math performance by the 
Hispanic subgroup and/or (b) failing non-White and non-Hispanic in failing schools, save 
for failure by Hispanic and/or White subgroups. With respect to the former, a positive 
sign and statistically significant value on 7α  indicates greater gains on average in math 
by failing Hispanic students than by passing Hispanic students in schools that failed due 
to poor math performance by the Hispanic subgroup, suggesting that these schools 
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targeted resources to failing students in a failing subgroup at the expense of their passing 
peers. 
The value on 8α , identified by )1()2( ....... −− ×× tijijttj MISATFMWHITESUBFMPROFF ,  
is the Failing Student X White Subgroup interaction. 8α  represents whether the average 
test-score gain in math of failing White students enrolled in schools that failed to meet 
ISAAP proficiency standards due to failing math performance by White subgroup 
differed from the average test-score gain in math of (a) passing White students also 
enrolled in schools that failed due to failing math performance by the White subgroup 
and/or (b) failing non-White and non-Hispanic in failing schools, save for failure by 
Hispanic and/or White subgroups. With respect to the former, a positive sign and 
statistically significant value on 8α  indicates greater gains on average in math by failing 
White students than by passing White students in schools that failed due to poor math 
performance by the White subgroup, suggesting that these schools targeted resources to 
failing students in a failing subgroup at the expense of their passing peers.  
Nonfailing schools may also have responded strategically to ISAAP. It is 
plausible nonfailing schools desire to avoid negative publicity associated with being 
labeled failing in the future and therefore allocate additional resources to failing students. 
The value on 9α , identified by )1(.. −tijMISATF , represents whether the average test-score 
gain in math of failing non-White and non-Hispanic students in passing schools differed 
from that of similarly situated passing non-White and non-Hispanic peers. A positive and 
statistically significant value on 9α  suggests nonfailing schools may have responded to  
the potential stigma associated with not meeting proficiency and/or the threat of sanctions 
imposed by ISAAP by elevating the gains of failing students in relation to those of 
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passing students. It is also plausible, however, that 9α  could represent evidence of 
regression to the mean. To account for this possible bias, models were rerun using a 
standardized fall-to-spring student gain score in math as the dependent variables. Results 
were robust across specifications using a standardized fall-to-spring gain score in math. 
The value on 10α , identified by ijttij HISPANICMISATF ×− )1(.. , represents whether 
the average test-score gain in math of failing Hispanic students enrolled in schools that 
met ISAAP’s proficiency standard in math the previous year differed from the average 
test-score gain in math of failing non-White and non-Hispanic students also enrolled in 
passing schools. A negative sign on the 10α  coefficient that is statistically different from 
zero suggests that fall-to-spring test score gains of failing Hispanic students are smaller, 
on average, than those of similarly situated, failing non-White and non-Hispanic students. 
The value on 11α , identified by ijttij WHITEMISATF ×− )1(.. , represents whether the 
average test-score gain in math of failing White students enrolled in schools that met 
ISAAP’s proficiency standard in math the previous year differed from the average test-
score gain in math of failing non-White and non-Hispanic students also enrolled in 
passing schools. A negative sign on the 11α  coefficient that is statistically different from 
zero suggests that fall-to-spring test score gains of failing White students in passing 
schools are smaller, on average, than those of non-White and non-Hispanic students also 
enrolled in passing schools. 
A Student X Subject general linear model with fixed effects is the preferred 
specification for estimating schools’ responses to ISAAP for several reasons. First, this 
model permits estimating relationships between a single dependent variable and more 
than one response variable simultaneously. In a single stage this model can isolate 
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whether a school, based on prior year’s performance, has targeted resources to (a) 
students in a failing subgroup, (b) students in a failing subject, and/or (c) students failing 
math on a failing subgroup. This model can also detect strategic responses by nonfailing 
schools to elevate achievement of failing students. 
Second, a school fixed effects estimator ( jµ ) was selected to control for observed 
and unobserved time invariant characteristics of the school that could be correlated with 
student achievement gains. Whether a school failed to meet proficiency may be 
correlated with student achievement gains. Suppose that student achievement gains in 
failing schools were, on average, smaller than nonfailing schools. If this is true, omitting 
school effects would yield biased estimates of the parameters of interest. Additionally, a 
school effects model is a within group estimator that attributes only within school 
movement in coefficients on parameters of interest. Thus, estimates measure how 
achievement gains change within failing schools as the school environment changes.   
Third, the model takes into consideration other confounding influences on the 
proposed general linear model specifications such as testing effects and peer effects. 
Previous research indicates that test difficulty may change from one year to the next 
(Heubert & Hauser, 1999; Klein, Hamilton, McCaffrey, & Stecher, 2003; Koretz & 
Barron, 1998). If test difficulty varies from year to year, and/or varies for different 
student population from year to year, estimates of tradeoffs will be biased. Because each 
grade and year represents a new test, a year by grade interaction ( tg γη × ) can be used to 
control for testing effects. 
Recent research suggests that peer achievement exerts a positive effect on 
achievement growth, and that students throughout a school’s test-score distribution 
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benefit from the presence of high-performing peers (Hanushek, Kain, Markman, & 
Rivkin, 2003).26 Because intraschool peer composition is likely to change from year to 
year, thereby rendering a cohort fixed effect an inadequate strategy to control for peer 
composition, I utilized a vector of variables to capture and control for the effect of peer 
composition ( jtΧ ). These variables include poverty status, as measured by eligibility for 
free or reduced price lunch, and school-level student background characteristics including 
percentage of students by race/ethnicity.  
 
                                                 
26Positive peer group effects on student outcomes have also been found at the college level 
(Zimmerman, 2003). 
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CHAPTER V 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to investigate strategic resource- 
allocation decision making by traditional public schools and public charter schools 
seeking to close the achievement gap among low- and high-performing students. This 
chapter reports findings from a series of general linear models using student-level data 
contained in the Northwest Evaluation Association’s Growth Research Database to ask 
the following research questions:  
1.  Have Idaho schools responded to ISAAP by raising the achievement of failing 
students relative to the achievement of nonfailing students? 
2.  Have Idaho schools responded to ISAAP by raising the achievement of failing 
student subgroups relative to the achievement of nonfailing student subgroups? 
3.  Have Idaho schools responded to ISAAP by raising the achievement of failing 
students at the expense of high-performing students? 
4.  Do other programmatic features of NCLB explain strategic resource-allocation 
practices, including severity of sanction, students in overlapping categories, and students 
in terminal grades? 
5.  Does increased market sensitivity found in public charter schools impact 
strategic resource-allocation practices? 
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Have Idaho Schools Raised the Achievement of Failing 
Students Relative to the Achievement of Nonfailing Students? 
 
This section reports results from models used to estimate if schools have 
responded to ISAAP by raising the achievement of low-performing students relative to 
that of high-performing students. The dependent variable across all reported models is a 
fall-to-spring measure of student test-score gain in mathematics as measured by the Idaho 
State Assessment Test. Two indicator variables denoting whether a student is likely to be 
targeted are used as regressors: (a) a binary variable indicating whether a student failed to 
meet the state-defined performance threshold on ISAT during the fall test administration, 
and (b) a continuous variable that measures the distance between a student’s fall ISAT 
score and the state-defined performance threshold. Control variables include percentage 
of students in a school by race and ethnicity and percentage of economically 
disadvantaged students as determined by free and reduced price lunch status. Select 
model specifications include Grade X Year and school fixed effects. 
 
Do Schools Target Failing Students? 
Table 4 displays estimates of the effect of a student failing to meet ISAAP’s 
grade-specific performance threshold on individual student growth. Model 1.1 
demonstrates a strong response by schools to elevate the performance of students scoring 
below ISAAP’s performance threshold. The estimate on the binary indicator 
variable, MISATF .. , is positive and statistically significant at 01.<α . In substantive 
terms, Model 1.1 reveals that students that failed to meet the state-defined performance 
standard on the fall ISAT test gained, on average, 3.03 points (SE = 0.0266) more than   
 
 59
Table 4  
Effect of Failing Fall Math ISAT on Math Performance (General Linear Regression Model with Math Gain Score Fall-
to-Spring as the Dependent Variable) 
                  
 Student Failed the Fall ISAT Math Test          (F.ISAT.M) 
Student Failed the Fall ISAT Math Test, Adjusted 
for Expected Gain                           
(F.ISAT.ADJ.M) 
 None School 
School 
Grade X 
Year 
School 
Grade X 
Yeara None School 
School 
Grade X 
Year 
School 
Grade X 
Yeara 
Variable Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 Model 1.4 Model 1.5 Model 1.6 Model 1.7 Model 1.8
3.033*** 2.989*** 2.965*** 2.928*** F.ISAT.M 
(0.0266) (0.0258) (0.0255) (0.0249) 
-- -- -- -- 
2.883*** 3.512*** 3.766*** 3.682*** F.ISAT.ADJ.M -- -- -- -- 
(0.0293) (0.0284) (0.0280) (0.0273) 
Note. School-level controls for race/ethnicity and free and reduced price lunch status included. Estimates are weighted 
by total number of students at each campus who take the math ISAT test. Robust standard errors reported in 
parentheses. R2 for models: Model 1.1 = 0.0440, Model 1.2 = 0.1203, Model 1.3 = 0.1454, Model 1.4 = 0.1499, Model 
1.5 = 0.0340, Model 1.6 = 0.1257, Model 1.7 = 0.1575, and Model 1.8 = 0.1612. Observations for models: Models 1.1-
1.3 and 1.5-1.7 = 307,758; Models 1.4 and 1.8 = 307,136.  
aSuspicious values removed; suspicious values defined by values 1.5 IQR above Q3 and 1.5 IQR below Q1. 
***p < .01.  
 
 
the average passing student when controlling for race, ethnicity, and free and reduced 
price lunch status at the school level. 
However, Model 1.1 does not take into consideration time-invariant school 
characteristics such as school climate, teaching staff, school and district leadership, and 
peer climate, all of which exert a known influence on student achievement. 
Consequently, Model 1.2 includes school fixed effects to control for intercampus 
differences that are stable over time and likely correlated with student achievement gains. 
Inclusion of school fixed effects also takes into consideration any systematic variation 
across districts and communities (Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004). 
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Estimates produced by Model 1.2 remained consistent with those reported in the 
parsimonious form; that is, students that scored below ISAAP’s performance threshold on 
the fall ISAT administration demonstrated greater test-score growth throughout the 
academic year than similarly situated nonfailing students. Indeed, when controlling for 
school fixed effects and for race, ethnicity, and free and reduced price lunch status at the 
school level, the average difference between students that failed to meet the state-defined 
performance standard on the fall ISAT test and the average passing student was 2.99 
points (SE = 0.0258). Inclusion of school fixed effects increased the proportion of 
variance explained to 12.03%. 
Model 1.3 includes Grade X Year fixed effects to difference out any instability in 
ISAT. While NWEA reports attest to the stability, reliability, and validity of ISAT 
(Hauser & Kingsbury, 2004), empirical research frequently has documented instability in 
standardized test instruments (Ballou, 2002; Braun, 1988; Heubert & Hauser, 1999; Yen, 
1986). Indeed, when controlling for potential changes in test difficulty through inclusion 
of Grade X Year fixed effects, the estimated effects of failing on student performance 
hold strongly in comparison to those reported in models 1.1 and 1.2. Specifically, Model 
1.3 approximates a test-score gain difference of 2.97 points (SE = 0.0255), whereby 
failing students outperform their nonfailing student counterparts from the fall-to-spring 
administration of ISAT. In this specification the value on the coefficient of determination 
increased modestly to 14.54%. 
Using Grade X Year effects to control for variation in calibration of test difficulty 
assumes potential instabilities do not differentially impact certain students and student 
subgroups. This assumption is potentially problematic in that all Idaho public school 
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students are required to take the math ISAT assessment two times per year–once in the 
fall and then again in the spring–yet ISAAP only sanctions schools and districts 
according to spring outcomes. Suppose a group of ISAT test takers consider the fall ISAT 
a nuisance and, as a consequence, underperform on the test, thereby causing observed 
fall-to-spring gain scores to be artificially inflated for these students. If such a scenario is 
nonrandom, and the magnitude of these test-score gains is not severe enough to be 
detected by the outlier algorithm employed in this study, then estimates of the effect of 
failing on student performance will be biased upward. A similar effect also might occur 
should teachers downplay the significance of the test in the fall. 
Given such, Model 1.4 estimates the effect of failing to meet state-defined 
performance threshold on student performance after removing student observations with 
“suspicious” gain scores from the sample. Suspicious gain scores are defined as any value 
1.5 IQR below Q1 or 1.5 IQR above Q3, but no less than 3 IQR below Q1 or no greater 
than 3 IQR above Q3, respectively. As indicated in column 5 of Table 4, the coefficient 
on MISATF .. is statistically different from zero at the 01.<α . The estimated effect 
suggests that the average failing student’s fall-to-spring gain score is 2.93 points (SE = 
0.0249) greater than a similarly situated nonfailing student. 
To put the magnitude of the estimated growth differentials between failing and 
nonfailing students in perspective, the weighted mean fall-to-spring gain score is 8.91 
points with a standard deviation of 6.92 points. Estimates generated from Model 1.4 
approximate that the average failing student gains two fifths of a standard deviation more 
than a nonfailing student in a single school year after controlling for the racial, ethnic, 
and economic composition of a student’s peers as well as time-invariant school 
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characteristics. In substantive terms, in a single year this average difference is the 
equivalent of 8 percentile points in the achievement distribution for a below-average third 
grader. 
 
Do Schools Target Students Expected to Fail? 
 A concern with the previous estimates stems from MISATF ..  not taking into 
consideration the expected test-score gains of Idaho public school students from the fall-
to-spring administration of ISAT. Although marginal students just below the performance 
threshold are labeled failing according to MISATF .. , in reality these students are 
expected to meet, or even exceed, ISAAP’s defined performance threshold given that the 
average student’s test score increases by eight points from the fall to spring. If schools 
indeed are targeting resources to failing students, this omission likely biases downward 
the average test-score gain estimated by MISATF .. for students expected to fail the 
spring ISAT after taking into consideration projected fall-to-spring gains. 
Internal test-score reporting under ISAAP intensifies this supposition. NWEA 
furnishes classroom teachers and building principals with student-specific proficiency 
reports within 3 days of administration of the fall ISAT. These reports identify (a) 
students’ performance against proficiency growth targets in prior years, (b) the quartile 
distribution of classrooms against norm groups, and (c) students’ projected individual 
performance on spring administration of ISAT (Northwest Evaluation Association, 
2006). Accordingly, teachers and principals are positioned both to make knowledge-
based resource-allocation decisions in the short run to avoid ISAAP sanctions and to 
track progress of current and incoming students over time. 
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To explore whether reported estimates are negatively biased, models 1.1 through 
1.4 are reestimated using MADJISATF ... . MADJISATF ... captures meaningful 
differences in average student gains by grade given that average fall-to-spring test-score 
gains ranged from 6.24 points to 12.57 points. The largest observed gains occurred in 
grades 3 and 4, whereas the smallest observed gains occurred in grades 7 and 8. Indeed, a 
two-sample t test indicated that average gains in grades 3, 4, and 5 were statistically 
greater than gains in grades 7 and 8 at the 01.<α  level.  
Using MADJISATF ...  as a proxy for expected student test performance in the 
spring, the mean percentage of failing students across all years in the sample is calculated 
as 27.2%, an estimate similar to the 28.3% of students reported by Idaho as having failed 
the spring ISAT over the 3-year period under study. MADJISATF ... also reduces the 
total number of students identified as failing under the unadjusted indicator variable 
MISATF .. by 50%. 
The panel on the right-hand side of Table 4 reports the estimated difference on 
student test-score gains from fall-to-spring administration of ISAT, taking into account 
inclusion in the passing achievement distribution of those marginal failing students 
whose projected fall-to-spring test-score gain would result in their passing the 
performance threshold. The coefficients on MADJISATF ... are statistically different 
from zero at the 01.<α  level, and the sign on the coefficients is positive across all 
specifications. The magnitude of the estimated difference between failing and nonfailing 
student achievement gains increased in models 1.5 through 1.8, relative to those reported 
for MISATF ..  in models 1.1 through 1.4, suggesting that the unadjusted indicator biased 
downward the average estimated test-score gain for failing students. Indeed, Model 1.8 
 64
approximates a difference of 3.68 points (SE = 0.0273) between failing and nonfailing 
students, whereas Model 1.4 approximated a difference of 2.93 points (SE = 0.0249).  
To test whether the reported differences in models 1.1 through 1.4 and in models 
1.5 through 1.8 are statistically different, four unrestricted models were estimated in 
which MISATF ..  and MADJISATF ...  were included. These models took form as: 
 .
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While full results are not reported, the coefficients on the difference-in-difference 
estimates were statistically significant across all models. MADJISATF ...  offers strong 
evidence that Idaho public schools focused on elevating the performance of students 
expected to fail the spring ISAT test after taking consideration the projected average test-
score gain in that grade. 
 
Does a Student’s Location Relative to ISAAP’s Performance Threshold Matter? 
Table 5 reports the estimated effect on student test-score gains of a student’s 
location in the test-score distribution relative to ISAAP’s grade-specific performance 
threshold. MGAPST .. , the indicator variable constructed to capture distance from the 
performance threshold, is expressed as the additive inverse of the distance of a student’s 
ISAT score from the state-defined performance threshold. MGAPST .. has a mean value 
of 1.86, standard deviation of 11.99, and range of 65.81 after stripping out extreme 
outlier values. 
Results reported in Table 5 are similar to those identified and discussed in Table 
4. The signs on MGAPST .. are positive, and the coefficients are statistically different 
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Table 5  
Effect of Student Distance from ISAAP Performance Threshold on Math Performance (General Linear Regression Model 
with Math Gain Score Fall-to-Spring as the Dependent Variable) 
 Student Distance from ISAAP Performance Threshold (ST.GAP.M) 
Student Distance from ISAAP Performance 
Threshold, Adjusted for Expected Gain 
(ST.GAP.ADJ.M) 
 None School 
School 
Grade X 
Year 
School 
Grade X 
Yeara None School 
School 
Grade X 
Year 
School Grade 
X Yeara 
Variable Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Model 2.4 Model 2.5 Model 2.6 Model 2.7 Model 2.8 
0.1654*** 0.1696*** 0.1698*** 0.1633*** ST.GAP.M 
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
-- -- -- -- 
1.142*** 1.201*** 1.221*** 1.1762*** 
ST.GAP.ADJ.M -- -- -- -- 
(0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0064) 
Note. School-level controls for race/ethnicity and free and reduced price lunch status included. Estimates are weighted by 
total number of students at each campus who take the math ISAT test. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. R2 
for models: Model 2.1 = 0.0915, Model 2.2 = 0.1716, Model 2.3 = 0.1967, Model 2.4 = 0.1968, Model 2.5 = 0.0867, 
Model 2.6 = 0.1712, Model 2.7 = 0.1992, and Model 2.8 = 0.1992. Observations for models: Models 2.1-2.3 and 2.5-2.7 = 
307,758; Models 2.4 and 2.8 = 307,136.  
aSuspicious values removed; suspicious values defined by values 1.5 IQR above Q3 and 1.5 IQR below Q1. 
***p < .01.   
 
 
from zero at the 01.<α  level. The estimated effect in Model 2.4, for example, suggests 
that the average failing student’s fall-to-spring gain score is 0.16 points (SE = 0.0009) 
greater for each unit a student is away from ISAT’s grade-specific performance threshold 
when controlling for race/ethnicity, free and reduced lunch status, school fixed effects, 
and Grade X Year fixed effects. Furthermore, the percentage of variance explained 
around the mean reaches 19.7% in models 2.3 and 2.4. 
Models 2.5 through 2.8 report estimated differences in test-score gains and losses 
for students across the achievement distribution after adjusting MGAPST ..  for average 
expected fall-to-spring test score gains in math by grade. The adjusted variable is 
 66
identified as MADJGAPST ... . The signs on MADJGAPST ... are positive, and the 
coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 01.<α  level. Once again, the 
percentage of variance explained around the mean reaches 19.9% in the complete model 
specifications, which include controls for race/ethnicity, free and reduced lunch status, 
school fixed effects, and Grade X Year fixed effects. 
Even though model specifications using MGAPST ..  and MADJGAPST ... as 
indicator variables indicate a positive slope across their respective distributions with 
average gains increasing monotonically from the highest to lowest achieving students, 
these specifications impose a strong assumption on the relationship between students’ 
test-score gains and their location in the achievement distribution; that being, the amount 
by which the gain increases for a student who starts at a particular point below the cut off 
will equal the amount by which the gain diminishes for a student who starts at the same 
point but above the cut off. By imposing such a strong assumption on the relationship of 
MGAPST ..  and MADJGAPST ... to student gains, the estimates are likely to be biased. 
As such, Table 6 displays estimated differences in test-score gains and losses for 
students across the achievement distribution allowing for completely different outcomes 
when a student passes or fails the fall ISAT. The unadjusted passing and failing 
MGAPST .. variables, denoted as MPASSGAPST ...  and MFAILGAPST ... , are reported 
in models 3.1 through 3.4, respectively. The adjusted passing and failing MGAPST ..  
variables, denoted as MADJPASSGAPST ....  and MADJFAILGAPST .... , are reported in 
models 3.5 through 3.8, respectively. The coefficients across all model specifications are 
positive and statistically different from zero at the 01.<α  level. 
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Table 6  
Effect of Student Distance from ISAAP Performance Threshold on Math Performance Using ST.GAP.FAIL.M and 
ST.GAP.PASS.M (General Linear Regression Model with Math Gain Score Fall-to-Spring as the Dependent Variable) 
 
Student Distance from ISAAP Performance 
Threshold (ST.GAP.FAIL.M and 
ST.GAP.PASS.M) 
Student Distance from ISAAP Performance 
Threshold, Adjusted for Expected Gain 
(ST.GAP.FAIL.ADJ.M and 
ST.GAP.PASS.ADJ.M) 
 None School 
School 
Grade X 
Year 
School 
Grade X 
Yeara None School 
School 
Grade X 
Year 
School 
Grade X 
Yeara 
Variable Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 Model 3.4 Model 3.5 Model 3.6 Model 3.7 Model 3.8
0.1968*** 0.2264*** 0.2329*** 0.2186***ST.GAP.FAIL.M 
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
-- -- -- -- 
0.1198*** 0.0861*** 0.0769*** 0.0832***ST.GAP.PASS.M 
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
-- -- -- -- 
1.0084*** 1.4554*** 1.6907*** 1.5914***ST.GAP.FAIL.ADJ.M -- -- -- -- (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0107) 
1.3374*** 0.8294*** 0.5379*** 0.5813***ST.GAP.PASS.ADJ.M -- -- -- -- (0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0138) 
Note. School-level controls for race/ethnicity and free and reduced price lunch status included. Estimates are weighted by 
total number of students at each campus who take the math ISAT test. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. R2 
for models: Model 3.1 = 0.0933, Model 3.2 = 0.1774, Model 3.3 = 0.2038, Model 3.4 = 0.2024, Model 3.5 = 0.0875, 
Model 3.6 = 0.1737, Model 3.7 = 0.2069, and Model 3.8 = 0.2054. Observations for models: Models 3.1-3.3 and 3.5-3.7 
= 307,758; Models 3.4 and 3.8 = 307,136.  
aSuspicious values removed; suspicious values defined by values 1.5 IQR above Q3 and 1.5 IQR below Q1. 
***p < .01.   
 
 
Allowing for completely different outcomes when MGAPST .. and 
MADJGAPST ... are negative and positive alters the magnitude of the reported estimates. 
To illustrate, Figure 3 juxtaposes average differences in fall-to-spring test-score gains in 
math for MADJGAPST ... against those for MADJFAILGAPST .... and 
MADJPASSGAPST .... . Coefficients on MFAILGAPST ...  and MADJFAILGAPST ....   
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Figure 3.  Effect of distance from ISAT performance threshold on math performance. 
 
 
increased in size whereas the coefficient on MPASSGAPST ... and 
MADJPASSGAPST .... decreased in size in relation to the magnitude of the coefficient 
values reported in Table 5. Nevertheless, these findings suggest that traditional public 
schools in Idaho are elevating the average performance of failing students relative to that 
of passing students. 
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As previously discussed, regression to the mean potentially confounds 
identification of achievement tradeoffs by leading to overstatement of schools’ actual 
responses to Idaho’s minimum competency accountability program. Accordingly, models 
were reestimated using a standardized fall-to-spring student gain score in math as the 
dependent variable. The coefficient estimates on MISATF .. , MADJISATF ... , 
MGAPST .. , MADJGAPST ... , MFAILGAPST ... , MPASSGAPST ... , 
MADJFAILGAPST .... , and MADJPASSGAPST .... are robust across specifications using 
a standardized fall-to-spring gain score in math.  
The preceding section explored several variations on the two primary indicator 
variables used to denote whether a student was likely to be targeted and specified a series 
of models thereon, culminating in a complete model specification that controlled for the 
impact of peer composition, school effects, and Grade X Year effects. In addition to the 
importance of including a full set of controls, I found MADJISATF ...  and 
MADJFAILGAPST ....  and MADJPASSGAPST ....  to be superior indicators of whether a 
student was likely to be targeted by schools responding to Idaho’s minimum competency 
accountability program. As such, subsequent reporting of the Student X Subject 
interaction general linear models focus on estimates for indicator variables 
MADJISATF ... , MADJFAILGAPST .... , and MADJPASSGAPST ....  when controlling 
for peer composition, school effects, and Grade X Year effects. 
 
Have Idaho Schools Responded to ISAAP by Raising 
the Achievement of Failing Students and Failing Student Subgroups? 
 
The following section reports results from a more refined series of model 
specifications used to estimate if schools strategically targeted resources to failing 
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students and student subgroups. Table 7 displays estimates from the Student X Subject 
interaction model. The 1α  coefficient, denoted by MPROFF .. , is a key parameter of 
interest in detecting high-/low-achievement tradeoffs. The sign on the MPROFF ..  
coefficient is positive, and the value is statistically different from zero at the 05.<α  
level. This estimate indicates that passing non-Hispanic and passing non-White students 
enrolled in failing schools gained, on average, 0.16 points more (SE = 0.0738) than non-
failing, non-Hispanic and non-failing, non-White students enrolled in passing schools. 
As indicated in models 5.7 and 5.8 in Table 8, the estimates on the 1α  coefficient 
are not statistically significant when MADJFAILGAPST .... and 
MADJPASSGAPST .... are used as indicator variables. These estimates indicate that 
average student gains for passing non-Hispanic and passing non-White students enrolled 
in failing schools are not statistically different from passing non-Hispanic and passing 
non-White students enrolled in schools that met ISAAP’s proficiency standard.  
The 4α  and 5α coefficients, denoted by F.PROF.M ×  HISPANIC and  
F.PROF.M ×  WHITE, are also key parameters of interest (Table 7). The sign on 
F.PROF.M ×  HISPANIC is positive, and the value is statistically different from zero at 
the 01.<α  level. Model 4.8 reports that Hispanic students who attended a school that 
failed to meet ISAAP due to poor performance by Hispanic students gained, on average, 
0.24 points (SE = 0.0764) more than student who are not in the failing subgroup but who 
also attended a school that failed. This finding suggests that schools that failed to meet 
ISAAP proficiency standard due to poor performance by Hispanic students in math 
targeted resources to the Hispanic subgroup. 
 71
 
Table 7 
Effect of ISAAP on Math Performance Using a Student X Subject Interaction Model and Failed ISAT (General Linear 
Regression Model with Math Gain Score Fall-to-Spring as the Dependent Variable)  
 
School Failed to Meet ISAAP Proficiency 
Standard (F.PROF.M), Student Failed Fall ISAT 
Math Test (F.ISAT.M), Student Part of Failing 
Subgroup (F.SUB X M)  
School Failed to Meet ISAAP Proficiency 
Standard (F.PROF.M), Student Failed Fall ISAT 
Math Test (F.ISAT.ADJ.M), Student Part of 
Failing Subgroup (F.SUB X M)  
 None School 
School     
Grade X 
Year 
School     
Grade X 
Yeara None School 
School     
Grade X 
Year 
School     
Grade X 
Yeara 
Variable Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3 Model 4.4 Model 4.5 Model 4.6 Model 4.7 Model 4.8 
-0.1696** 0.6481*** 0.0264 0.0453 -0.0567 0.8000*** 0.1519** 0.1603** F.PROF.M  (α1) (0.0739) (0.0826) (0.0869) (0.0847) (0.0609) (0.0709) (0.0757) (0.0738) 
-0.8045*** -0.8307*** -0.7790*** -0.7341*** -0.6250*** -0.6609*** -0.6579*** -0.6386***HISPANIC  (α2) (0.1286) (0.1269) (0.1260) (0.1227) (0.0977) (0.0964) (0.0955) (0.0931) 
0.1778* 0.1655* 0.1832* 0.1879* 0.1590** 0.1493* 0.1697** 0.1579** WHITE  (α3) (0.1020) (0.1006) (0.0999) (0.0973) (0.0810) (0.0798) (0.0791) (0.0771) 
-0.0398 0.0671 0.1088 0.0950 0.0692 0.2023*** 0.2516*** 0.2388***F.PROF.M X F.SUB.HISP.M   
(α4) 
(0.0809) (0.0908) (0.0906) (0.0882) (0.0669) (0.0785) (0.0783) (0.0764) 
0.0537 1.0952*** 0.7718*** 0.7054*** 0.2498** 1.3808*** 1.0542*** 0.9738***F.PROF.M X F.SUB.WHITE.M   
(α5) 
(0.1421) (0.1551) (0.1554) (0.1514) (0.1128) (0.1289) (0.1293) (0.1260) 
0.9792*** 0.8511*** 0.7847*** 0.7415*** -- -- -- -- F.PROF.M X 
F.ISAT.M  (α6) (0.1006) (0.1001) (0.0994) (0.0969)         
-- -- -- -- 1.4629*** 1.2194*** 1.0933*** 1.0480***F.PROF.M X 
F.ISAT.ADJ.M  (α6')         (0.1085) (0.1074) (0.1066) (0.1039) 
0.2025* 0.2136** 0.2096** 0.2380** -- -- -- -- F.PROF.M X F.SUB.HISP.M X 
F.ISAT.M  (α7) 
(0.1082) (0.1076) (0.1068) (0.1040)         
0.1798 0.2403 0.2839 0.2587 -- -- -- -- F.PROF.M X F.SUB.WHITE.M X 
F.ISAT.M  (α8) 
(0.1808) (0.1790) (0.1777) (0.1731)         
-- -- -- -- -0.1286 -0.0953 -0.1083 -0.0622 F.PROF.M X 
F.SUB.HISP.M X 
F.ISAT.ADJ.M  (α7') 
        (0.1156) (0.1144) (0.1134) (0.1106) 
      (table continues)
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Table 7 (continued)         
 
School Failed to Meet ISAAP Proficiency 
Standard (F.PROF.M), Student Failed Fall ISAT 
Math Test (F.ISAT.M), Student Part of Failing 
Subgroup (F.SUB X M)  
School Failed to Meet ISAAP Proficiency 
Standard (F.PROF.M), Student Failed Fall ISAT 
Math Test (F.ISAT.ADJ.M), Student Part of 
Failing Subgroup (F.SUB X M)  
 None School 
School     
Grade X 
Year 
School     
Grade X 
Yeara None School 
School     
Grade X 
Year 
School     
Grade X 
Yeara 
Variable Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3 Model 4.4 Model 4.5 Model 4.6 Model 4.7 Model 4.8 
-- -- -- -- -0.2927 -0.3399** -0.2786 -0.2782 F.PROF.M X 
F.SUB.WHITE.M X 
F.ISAT.ADJ.M  (α8') 
        (0.1798) (0.1777) (0.1761) (0.1717) 
2.7862*** 2.8972*** 2.9258*** 2.9384*** -- -- -- -- F.ISAT.M  (α9) (0.1308) (0.1293) (0.1284) (0.1251)         
-- -- -- -- 3.3285*** 3.4931*** 3.6529*** 3.6074***F.ISAT.ADJ.M  (α9')         (0.1337) (0.1322) (0.1310) (0.1278) 
0.4111*** 0.4512*** 0.3894** 0.3201** -- -- -- -- F.ISAT.M X 
HISPANIC  (α10) (0.1585) (0.1565) (0.1554) (0.1514)         
-0.2927*** -0.2604** -0.2900*** -0.3370*** -- -- -- -- F.ISAT.M X WHITE  
(α11) (0.1326) (0.1310) (0.1300) (0.1267)         
-- -- -- -- 0.0979 0.1769 0.1510 0.1149 F.ISAT.ADJ.M X 
HISPANIC  (α10')         (0.1530) (0.1512) (0.1498) (0.1461) 
-- -- -- -- -0.2355* -0.1833 -0.2174 -0.2590**F.ISAT.ADJ.M X 
WHITE  (α11')         (0.1357) (0.1341) (0.1329) (0.1296) 
            
Note. School-level controls for race/ethnicity and free and reduced price lunch status included. Estimates are weighted by 
total number of students at each campus who take the math ISAT test. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. R2 
for models: Model 4.1 = 0.1089, Model 4.2 = 0.1351, Model 4.3 = 0.1476, Model 4.4 = 0.1520, Model 4.5 = 0.1177, 
Model 4.6 = 0.1447, Model 4.7 = 0.1598, and Model 4.8 = 0.1635. Observations for models: Models 4.1-4.3 and 4.5-4.7 = 
307,758; Models 4.4 and 4.8 = 307,136.  
aSuspicious values removed; suspicious values defined by values 1.5 IQR above Q3 and 1.5 IQR below Q1. 
* p < .10.     **p < .05.     ***p < .01.  
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Table 8 
Effect of ISAAP on Math Performance Using a Student X Subject Interaction Model and Student Gap (General Linear 
Regression Model with Math Gain Score Fall-to-Spring as the Dependent Variable)  
 
School Failed to Meet ISAAP Proficiency 
Standard (F.PROF.M), Student Part of Failing 
Subgroup (F.SUB X M), Student Distance from 
ISAAP Performance Threshold (ST.GAP.M) 
School Failed to Meet ISAAP Proficiency 
Standard (F.PROF.M), Student Part of Failing 
Subgroup (F.SUB X M), Student Distance from 
ISAAP Performance Threshold (ST.GAP.ADJ.M)
 None School 
School     
Grade X 
Year 
School     
Grade X 
Yeara None School 
School     
Grade X 
Year 
School     
Grade X 
Yeara 
Variable Model 5.1 Model 5.2 Model 5.3 Model 5.4 Model 5.5 Model 5.6 Model 5.7 Model 5.8
-0.2501*** -0.2501*** -0.0675 -0.0170 -0.3294*** 0.5717*** -0.1155 -0.0631 F.PROF.M (α1) (0.0798) (0.0798) (0.0903) (0.0887) (0.0771) (0.0847) (0.0879) (0.0863) 
-1.3895*** -1.3895*** -1.4449*** -1.3867*** -1.1268*** -1.2295*** -1.2390*** -1.1861***HISPANIC (α2) (0.1187) (0.1187) (0.1160) (0.1145) (0.1104) (0.1089) (0.1079) (0.1063) 
0.3498*** 0.3498*** 0.3504*** 0.3945*** 0.3663*** 0.3620*** 0.3621*** 0.3994***WHITE (α3) (0.1015) (0.1015) (0.0992) (0.0980) (0.0948) (0.0934) (0.0926) (0.0912) 
0.2819*** 0.2819*** 0.4211*** 0.3829*** 0.3364*** 0.4744*** 0.4930*** 0.4512***F.PROF.M X 
F.SUB.HISP.M (α4) (0.0868) (0.0868) (0.0946) (0.0930) (0.0841) (0.0928) (0.0924) (0.0909) 
0.0499 0.1407 1.1293*** 1.0895*** -0.0843 1.3722*** 1.0637*** 0.9995***F.PROF.M X F.SUB.WHITE.M 
(α5) 
(0.1407) (0.1407) (0.1524) (0.1502) (0.1364) (0.1491) (0.1487) (0.1464) 
0.0833*** 0.0833*** 0.0673*** 0.0607*** -- -- -- -- F.PROF.M X ST.GAP.FAIL.M  
(α6) 
(0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0058)         
-0.0230*** -0.0230*** -0.0291*** -0.0242*** -- -- -- -- F.PROF.M X ST.GAP.PASS.M  
(α7) 
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0075)         
-- -- -- -- 0.8175*** 0.7023*** 0.6190*** 0.5659***F.PROF.M X ST.GAP.FAIL. 
ADJ.M  (α6') 
        (0.0426) (0.0422) (0.0420) (0.0420) 
-- -- -- -- -0.2336*** -0.2446*** -0.1955*** -0.1575***F.PROF.M X ST.GAP.PASS. 
ADJ.M  (α7') 
        (0.0535) (0.0536) (0.0534) (0.0526) 
-0.0161*** -0.0161*** -0.0158*** -0.0118* -- -- -- -- 
F.PROF.M X 
F.SUB.HISP.M X 
ST.GAP.FAIL.M  
(α8) 
(0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0061)         
      (table continues)
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Table 8 (continued)         
 
School Failed to Meet ISAAP Proficiency 
Standard (F.PROF.M), Student Part of Failing 
Subgroup (F.SUB X M), Student Distance from 
ISAAP Performance Threshold (ST.GAP.M) 
School Failed to Meet ISAAP Proficiency 
Standard (F.PROF.M), Student Part of Failing 
Subgroup (F.SUB X M), Student Distance from 
ISAAP Performance Threshold (ST.GAP.ADJ.M)
 None School 
School     
Grade X 
Year 
School     
Grade X 
Yeara None School 
School     
Grade X 
Year 
School     
Grade X 
Yeara 
Variable Model 5.1 Model 5.2 Model 5.3 Model 5.4 Model 5.5 Model 5.6 Model 5.7 Model 5.8
-0.0213** -0.0213** -0.0211** -0.0239*** -- -- -- -- F.PROF.M X 
F.SUB.WHITE.M X 
ST.GAP. FAIL.M  
(α10) 
(0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0088) (0.0089)         
0.0235*** 0.0235*** 0.0226*** 0.0200** -- -- -- -- F.PROF.M X F.SUB.HISP.M X 
ST.GAP.PASS.M  
(α9) 
(0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0081)         
0.0056 0.0056 0.0126 0.0182 -- -- -- -- F.PROF.M X 
F.SUB.WHITE.M X 
ST.GAP. PASS.M  
(α11) 
(0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0155) (0.0152)         
-- -- -- -- -0.2155*** -0.1732*** -0.1738*** -0.1410***F.PROF.M X 
F.SUB.HISP.M X 
ST.GAP.FAIL. 
ADJ.M  (α8') 
        (0.0451) (0.0447) (0.0443) (0.0444) 
-- -- -- -- -0.0594 -0.1035 -0.0828 -0.0893 
F.PROF.M X 
F.SUB.WHITE.M X 
ST.GAP.FAIL. 
ADJ.M  (α10') 
        (0.0656) (0.0650) (0.0644) (0.0649) 
-- -- -- -- 0.2156*** 0.1768*** 0.1758*** 0.1541***F.PROF.M X F.SUB.HISP.M X 
ST.GAP.PASS. 
ADJ.M  (α9') 
        (0.0581) (0.0581) (0.0576) (0.0567) 
-- -- -- -- -0.0736 0.0149 -0.0087 0.0212 F.PROF.M X 
F.SUB.WHITE.M X 
ST.GAP.PASS. 
ADJ.M  (α11') 
        (0.1140) (0.1131) (0.1122) (0.1100) 
0.2004*** 0.2004*** 0.2114*** 0.2031*** -- -- -- -- ST.GAP.FAIL.M  
(α12) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0067)         
0.0656*** 0.0656*** 0.0743*** 0.0754*** -- -- -- -- ST.GAP.PASS.M  
(α13) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0099) (0.0099)         
      (table continues)
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Table 8 (continued)         
 
School Failed to Meet ISAAP Proficiency 
Standard (F.PROF.M), Student Part of Failing 
Subgroup (F.SUB X M), Student Distance from 
ISAAP Performance Threshold (ST.GAP.M) 
School Failed to Meet ISAAP Proficiency 
Standard (F.PROF.M), Student Part of Failing 
Subgroup (F.SUB X M), Student Distance from 
ISAAP Performance Threshold (ST.GAP.ADJ.M)
 None School 
School     
Grade X 
Year 
School     
Grade X 
Yeara None School 
School     
Grade X 
Year 
School     
Grade X 
Yeara 
Variable Model 5.1 Model 5.2 Model 5.3 Model 5.4 Model 5.5 Model 5.6 Model 5.7 Model 5.8
-- -- -- -- 1.3412*** 1.4105*** 1.5194*** 1.4611***ST.GAP.FAIL. 
ADJ.M  (α12')         (0.0457) (0.0452) (0.0448) (0.0449) 
-- -- -- -- 0.5667*** 0.6171*** 0.4959*** 0.5061***ST.GAP.PASS. 
ADJ.M  (α13')         (0.0695) (0.0684) (0.0678) (0.0677) 
0.0409*** 0.0409*** 0.0443*** 0.0420*** -- -- -- -- ST.GAP.FAIL.M X 
HISPANIC  (α14) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0075) (0.0075)         
0.0007 0.0007 0.0020 -0.0075*** -- -- -- -- ST.GAP.FAIL.M X 
WHITE  (α15) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0068)         
-0.0371*** -0.0371*** -0.0452*** -0.0414* -- -- -- -- ST.GAP.PASS.M X 
HISPANIC  (α16) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0138) (0.0137)         
0.0158 0.0158 0.0141 0.0196 -- -- -- -- ST.GAP.PASS.M X 
WHITE  (α17) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0101)         
-- -- -- -- 0.2120*** 0.2672*** 0.2614*** 0.2459***
ST.GAP.FAIL. 
ADJ.M X 
HISPANIC (α14')         (0.0516) (0.0510) (0.0505) (0.0505) 
-- -- -- -- -0.0171 0.0023 0.0069 -0.0593 ST.GAP.FAIL. ADJ.M X WHITE  
(α15') 
        (0.0466) (0.0460) (0.0455) (0.0456) 
-- -- -- -- -0.0402 -0.1072 -0.1788* -0.1530 
ST.GAP.PASS. 
ADJ.M X 
HISPANIC (α16')         (0.0975) (0.0961) (0.0952) (0.0944) 
-- -- -- -- 0.1990* 0.1209* 0.1067 0.1418** ST.GAP.PASS. ADJ.M X WHITE 
(α17') 
        (0.0703) (0.0692) (0.0685) (0.0683) 
Note. School-level controls for race/ethnicity and free and reduced price lunch status included. Estimates are weighted 
by total number of students at each campus who take the math ISAT test. Robust standard errors reported in 
parentheses. R2 for models: Model 5.1 = 0.1675, Model 5.2 = 0.1675, Model 5.3 = 0.2081, Model 5.4 = 0.2049, Model 
5.5 = 0.1673, Model 5.6 = 0.1969, Model 5.7 = 0.2114, and Model 5.8 = 0.2079. Observations for models: Models 5.1-
5.3 and 5.5-5.7 = 307,758; Models 5.4 and 5.8 = 306,922.  
aSuspicious values removed; suspicious values defined by values 1.5 IQR above Q3 and 1.5 IQR below Q1. 
* p < .10.     **p < .05.     ***p < .01.  
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The sign on F.PROF.M ×  WHITE is positive, and the value is statistically 
different from zero at the 01.<α  level. Model 4.8 reports that White students who 
attended a school that failed to meet ISAAP due to poor performance by White students, 
on average, gained almost 1 point (SE = 0.1260) more than students who are not in the 
failing subgroup but who also attended a school that failed. This finding suggests that 
schools that failed to meet ISAAP proficiency standard due to poor performance by 
White students in math targeted resources to White subgroup. 
The magnitude of the differential test-score gain estimates on the 4α  and 
5α coefficients is remarkably similar to that produced in models when 
MADJFAILGAPST .... and MADJPASSGAPST .... are used as indicator variables (Table 
8). The magnitude of the Hispanic subgroup interaction increased modestly in size from 
0.24 to 0.45, whereas the estimate on the White subgroup interaction remained virtually 
identical to that reported earlier (i.e., value of 0.99 with SE = 0.1464). These findings 
provide strong evidence that schools that failed to meet ISAAP proficiency standard 
responded by elevating the achievement of students within that subgroup. 
The value on 6α , identified by MADJISATFMPROFF ..... × , is the failing 
student interaction (Table 7). The sign on the failing student interaction is positive, and 
the value is statistically different from zero at the 01.<α . The estimate suggests that the 
average student who is expected to fail the spring ISAT and who attended a school that 
failed to meet ISAAP proficiency standard in the year prior gained 1.05 points more (SE 
= 0.1039) than passing students that attended a school that failed. While this provides 
strong evidence that schools targeted resources to students expected to fail spring ISAT 
test, this strategic resource targeting does not appear to work to the detriment of students 
 77
expected to pass spring administration of ISAT. These results suggest that traditional 
Idaho public schools are operating in the absence of resource constraints. That is, in the 
face of increased accountability and threat of sanction, there is sufficient slack in the 
operation of traditional public schools in Idaho enabling schools elevate outcomes of 
low-performing students without diverting attention and resources away from other 
students.  
Models using MADJFAILGAPST .... and MADJPASSGAPST .... as indicator 
variables (Table 8) provide further illustration of the conclusion that gains have been 
realized through increased accountability and threat of sanction. Take, for example, the 
value on '7α , identified by MADJPASSGAPSTMPROFF ...... × . The sign on the passing 
student conditioning effect is negative, and the value is statistically different from zero at 
the 01.<α . The estimate suggests that the average student who is least expected to fail 
the spring ISAT and who attended a school that failed to meet ISAAP proficiency 
standard in the year prior will have greater gains than other failing students that are closer 
to ISAT performance threshold. 
Nevertheless, estimates on the student interaction and subject interaction do not 
fully explain the issue of interest, namely if schools responded to ISAAP’s incentive 
structure by targeting resources to failing students in failing subgroups. To provide a 
more refined specification of resource targeting, a three-way interaction is introduced. 
This three-way interaction permits examination of whether Idaho schools responded to 
ISAAP by targeting resources to failing students in failing subgroups at the expense of 
similarly situated peers who met proficiency.  
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The coefficient on 7α , identified by MISATFMHISPSUBFMPROFF ....... ×× , 
is the failing student by Hispanic subgroup interaction. The sign on the 7α  coefficient is 
negative. However, the value on 7α  coefficient is not statistically different from zero. 
This finding suggests that Hispanic students who failed math ISAT enrolled in a school 
that failed to meet ISAAP proficiency standard due to math performance by Hispanic 
subgroup do not differ from non-Hispanic, failing students in this type of failing schools. 
That is, schools did not target resources to failing students in the subgroup for which a 
school failed to meet ISAAP proficiency standard. 
The coefficient on 8α  is the failing student by White subgroup interaction, 
identified by MISATFMWHITESUBFMPROFF ....... ×× . The sign on the 8α  
coefficient is negative. However, the value on 7α  coefficient is not statistically different 
from zero. This suggests that White students who failed math ISAT enrolled in a school 
that failed to meet ISAAP proficiency standard due to math performance by Hispanic 
subgroup do not differ from non-White, failing students in this type of failing schools. 
That is, schools are not targeting resources to failing students in the subgroup for which a 
school failed to meet ISAAP proficiency standard.  
While estimates reported in models 4.7 and 4.8 (Table 7) for the failing student by 
White subgroup are consistent with those reported in models 5.7 and 5.8 (Table 8), the 
failing student by Hispanic subgroup interaction effect is statistically significant when 
MADJFAILGAPST ....  and MADJPASSGAPST .... are used as indicator variables. The 
estimated effect on 8α  is negative, suggesting that failing Hispanic students enrolled in 
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schools that failed to meet ISAAP proficiency standard do not gain, on average, less than 
passing peers. 
  
Do Estimated Effects Persist After 
Standardization of Students’ Fall-to-Spring Gain Scores? 
 
Each of the models reported have produced substantively and statistically 
significant indications of strategic resource allocation decision making by Idaho public 
schools in response to the state’s minimum competency accountability plan. Evidence has 
been relatively consistent across model specifications. Recognizing that previous research 
on achievement tradeoffs has questioned whether estimates are robust to influence of 
mean reverting bias (Reback, 2006), this study also modeled all specifications using a 
standardized fall-to-spring gain score in math.  
To test for robustness of the complete model to mean reversion, I followed a 
standardization procedure similar to that employed by Hanushek et al. (2005), whereby 
the initial achievement distribution in Idaho is defined by fall ISAT score and divided 
into 20 equal intervals for each unique combination of year and grade. The mean and 
standard deviation test-score gain for all students starting in a particular interval for each 
unique combination of year and grade are then computed. The standard fall-to-spring 
test-score gain for each student is calculated as the difference between that student’s 
nominal gain and the mean gain of all students in the interval over the standard deviation 
of all student gains in the interval. Thus, gains in each interval are distributed with a 
mean of zero and standard deviation of one. 
Results of subsequent analyses using standardized fall-to-spring gain score in 
math as the dependent variables suggest that initial findings on the parameters of interest 
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are not an artifact of mean reversion. This finding likely is due to the fact that the 
estimate on 9α  censored the influence of mean reversion. The magnitude of the estimate 
on 9α  reduced relative to the magnitude of other coefficients, suggesting that mean 
reversion was a source of bias on the 9α  coefficient in earlier estimates. The estimates on 
9α  , as expected, were 0.  
 
Does Increased Market Sensitivity Found in 
Public Charter Schools Impact Resource-Allocation Practices? 
 
Economist Milton Friedman asserted that introducing school choice into the 
public education system would encourage competition, which, in turn, would provoke 
traditional public schools to become more productive. Some 40 years after Friedman’s 
free-market arguments, an increasing number of parents now can choose from a number 
of school choice options, including magnet schools, charter schools, cyber-schools, 
private or independent schools, school vouchers, tax credits and deductions, and home 
schooling. Indeed, between 1993 and 2003, the percentage of students in 1st through 12th 
grade attending their “assigned” public school decreased from 80% to 74%, in 
comparison with an increase of 2.7 million students attending public schools of choice 
(National Center for Educational Statistics, 2004). 
Charter schools are held accountable under NCLB and, hence, subject to the same 
sanctions as traditional public schools. Thus, there are incentives for charter schools to 
engage in the same strategic tradeoffs as regular public schools. However, charter 
schools, by virtue of funding and enrollment policy, are more market sensitive than their 
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traditional public school counterparts, a condition that may attenuate allocation of 
resources to particular groups of students.  
This potential effect could manifest itself in a number of ways. For instance, a 
charter school may be more motivated than traditional public schools to avoid the stigma 
associated with AYP designation and any sanctions levied thereafter given the expense 
associated with operating a relatively new institution and the potentially crippling 
implications of an exodus of students that might, in comparison, represent no more than 
natural attrition to a larger, better-funded, and more stable public school. In a similar 
vein, a charter school is more likely to be resource constrained (Speakman, Finn, & 
Hassel, 2005), at least in the near term, thereby increasing the likelihood that resources 
could and would be diverted from certain students and student subgroups in order to 
elevate the performance of low-performing peers. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that school choice remains in its incipient stages in Idaho. 
There are only 17 charter schools in Idaho, of which only 6, 10, and 13 met ISAAP’s 
minimum n requirement during the 2002-03, 2003-04, and 2004-05 school years, 
respectively. Moreover, only two schools failed to meet AYP across all years and the 
total enrollment between the two schools was 156 students (113 and 43). As such, any 
meaningful comparisons between traditional public schools and public charter schools 
will require greater market penetration by charter institutions. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH, AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation investigated the strategic resource-allocation decision making of 
traditional public schools and public charter schools seeking to close the achievement gap 
among low- and high-performing students in response to the No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001, as well as factors hypothesized to explain this decision making. Both student-level, 
longitudinal test-score data furnished by the Northwest Evaluation Association and 
school-level accountability data collected from the Idaho State Department of Education 
were analyzed. 
Recognizing that no formal accounting system tracks allocation of resources at 
the student or classroom level, distributional inequities in student achievement among 
low- and high-performing student achievement were used to infer a reprioritization of 
intraschool resources. Specifically, an NCLB-induced resource-allocation decision was 
detected if a greater than expected increase in the achievement of traditionally low-
performing students occurred in tandem with a less than expected increase in the 
achievement of traditionally high-performing students. Key findings, implications for 
education policy, and directions for future research are summarized below. 
 
Findings and Policy Implications 
 There was strong evidence that Idaho public schools responded to NCLB by 
raising the achievement of failing students relative to that of passing students. Findings 
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were consistent across all indicator variables constructed to capture the likelihood a 
student was targeted with resources. Moreover, all estimates were robust across model 
specifications when a standardized fall-to-spring test-score gain in math was introduced 
as the dependent variable to gauge the potentially confounding influence of mean 
reverting measurement error on estimates. 
There was strong evidence that Idaho public schools responded to ISAAP’s threat 
of sanction by raising the achievement of students in failing subgroups. Hispanic students 
who attended a school that failed to meet ISAAP’s proficiency standard due to poor 
performance by Hispanic students gained, on average, between 0.24 and 0.45 points more 
than students who are not in the failing subgroup but also attended a school that failed. 
White students who attended a school that failed due to poor performance by White 
students in math gained, on average, between 0.97 and 0.99 points more than students 
who are not in the failing subgroup but who also attended a school that failed. All 
estimates were robust across model specifications when a standardized fall-to-spring gain 
score in math was used as the dependent variable. 
Evidence on whether failing schools target failing students in failing subgroups 
was inconsistent. While failing White students in schools that failed to meet ISAAP’s 
performance standard due to poor performance in math by White students gained no 
more or less than non-White, failing students in failing schools, estimated results on the 
failing student by Hispanic subgroup conditioning effect were split. One set of estimates 
suggested that the average test-score gain difference between failing Hispanic students in 
schools that did not meet ISAAP proficiency standard due to poor performance by 
Hispanic students and nonfailing students were statistically insignificant. However, when 
 84
MADJPASSGAPST .... and MADJFAILGAPST ....  were used as the indicator variables 
of interest, estimates indicated that failing Hispanic students gained less than failing non-
Hispanic students.  
 There was mixed evidence on the differential effect of ISAAP on passing students 
in nonfailing subgroups enrolled in failing schools. These estimates were either 
statistically different from zero with a positive sign on the estimated coefficient, or not 
statistically significant. Despite mixed evidence, it is worth noting that these estimates 
refute the supposition that Idaho’s minimum competency accountability program 
compromises educational needs and opportunities of high-performing, academically 
accelerated students. Indeed, these results provide evidence that there was slack in the 
operation of traditional public schools in Idaho, and that heightened accountability and 
threat of sanction spurred operational efficiency. 
This dissertation also explored whether other programmatic features of NCLB, 
such as severity of sanction, overlapping student categories, and students in terminal 
grades further explained strategic resource-allocation decision making. No evidence was 
found of the severity of sanctions impacting strategic resource-allocation decision 
making.27 However, investigation into the effect of severity of sanctions was limited 
given, first, that the data panel encompassed only 2 years of potential responses by 
schools to Idaho’s minimum competency accountability program and, second, that NCLB 
sanctions truly only kick in after a school fails proficiency for 3 consecutive years. This 
                                                 
27The least squares mean difference using the Tukey-Kramer adjustment for multiple comparisons 
between schools that failed to meet ISAAP proficiency standard for no years, 1 year, and 2 
consecutive years was used to determine that the mean difference between schools failing to meet 
ISAAP proficiency standard for 1 and 2 years, respectively, was not statistically different. 
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dynamic will be revisited when additional data become available and sanctions of 
increasing severity are imposed upon serially failing schools. 
There was no evidence of schools differentially targeting students whose 
performance influenced proficiency determination of more than one subgroup. Most 
student subgroups in Idaho for which NCLB requires states to hold schools accountable 
do not meet the state-defined minimum required n of 34 students. Furthermore, even if a 
school does satisfy the minimum n requirement for a marginally sized student subgroup, 
there is a good chance that particular student subgroup will fall below the minimum n the 
following year due to natural attrition and, hence, be exempted from AYP calculations. 
As such, homogeneity of Idaho’s student population renders the issue of students in 
overlapping categories largely irrelevant. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
Future iterations of this achievement tradeoff research will explore (a) additional 
measures of the degree to which students are likely to be targeted, (b) whether the task of 
meeting ISAAP performance targets is feasible, and (c) whether schools substitute 
resources across outcomes. 
Because ISAAP-induced resource-allocation decision making implies that schools 
target resources to students offering a greater return on expenditure for a given increase 
in test scores, subsequent techniques for estimating a school’s short-run incentive to 
target resources should take into consideration the probability that a school overlooks a 
student. Future research will explore the impact of ijtGAPRAT.  on student gains. 
ijtGAPRAT.  is the ratio of ijtGAPST .  and the gap between the passing threshold and the 
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marginal student whose improved performance is needed to meet state-defined 
proficiency standards under AYP, assuming that students who scored better than the 
marginal student but still below passing improve their test performance at the expected 
rate. If a school only needs three more students to pass the threshold to meet ISAAP’s 
proficiency standard in math, ijtGAPRAT.  quantifies the ratio between ijtGAPST .  and the 
gap between the proficiency threshold and the marginal student, as expressed in terms of 
the gap between the passing score and the test score of the marginal student. Furthermore, 
ijtGAPRAT.  advances ijtGAPST .  by taking into consideration how important a particular 
student is for a particular school to meet AYP and how far that school is from the state-
defined proficiency standard. 
Future research will also consider the magnitude of the task of improving failing 
subgroups in terms of the extent to which a particular subgroup is failing relative both to 
the size of that subgroup and to the total number of high-stakes students tested in the 
school. Specifically, a ratio variable will be introduced, and defined by the number of 
failing students in a particular subgroup that need to pass in order for that subgroup to 
meet AYP over the number of students tested in that subgroup. A second ratio variable 
will accompany the first, and be defined by the same number of failing students required 
to pass in that subgroup over the total number of high-stakes students tested in the school. 
In a resource-constrained environment, it is hypothesized that the likelihood of resources 
being allocated to a particular subgroup grows as the number of marginal students in that 
subgroup increases, but is tempered concomitantly by the size of that marginal subgroup 
in relation to the number of high-stakes students tested in the school. Fewer resources 
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available to nonfailing students and/or nonfailing student subgroups would suggest 
amplification of the low-/high-achievement tradeoff. 
Model specifications estimated in this study were restricted to a school failing to 
meet ISAAP’s proficiency standard due to poor math performance. A similar indicator 
variable could be created for reading and language arts both in and across subgroups for 
which ISAAP holds schools accountable. If schools failed to meet proficiency due to 
poor performance in reading are outcomes in mathematics affected? Or, do schools focus 
more resources on outcomes tied accountability? 
Specifically, I intend to examine if Idaho public schools reduce instruction in low-
stakes subjects. In 2005, Idaho entered into a flexibility agreement with the US 
Department of Education that permits districts to alter accountability program features 
required under NCLB. Specifically, the language arts portion of the ISAT was a high-
stakes exam in Idaho for 3 years (i.e., 2002-03, 2003-04, 2004-05 school years). Starting 
in the 2005-06 school year, however, the language arts test was replaced by state-defined 
student growth measures. To test for a subject tradeoff one can compare achievement 
before and after Idaho entered into flexibility agreement. 
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation set out to provide empirical evidence on achievement tradeoffs 
and NCLB. Recognizing that ideological predispositions have dominated burgeoning 
public and scholarly interest in distributional effects under NCLB’s accountability 
system, these findings provide much-needed evidence as Congress approaches 
reauthorization of NCLB in 2007. There is strong evidence in Idaho that NCLB’s threat 
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of sanctions increased incentives for schools and school districts to elevate learning 
opportunities for traditionally low-performing students and student subgroups, but that 
the increased performance by traditionally low-performing students and student 
subgroups did not occur at the expense of traditionally high-performing students. Indeed, 
it appears that Idaho’s response to NCLB is one of improved efficiency and not 
achievement tradeoffs, in that traditional public schools in the state did more with the 
same level and distribution of resources as in years past. 
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